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Dedication
Life has given me a very interesting twist of fate. I was born in Bogotá and grew up in a
neighborhood called Ciudad Jardín, which translates in English to “Garden City.” I don’t
know much about the history of Ciudad Jardín, but it is surely tied in to the larger
narrative of Howard’s vision of his Garden Cities. When my sister and I were little, our
parents brought us to the New York City borough of Queens, where we settled in the
garden city-inspired garden suburb of Kew Gardens. Growing up and living there has
been the main source of inspiration for this entire thesis and for my studies in historic
preservation here at Penn. My desire to protect Kew Gardens and to raise awareness of its
history and beauty come from a great source of gratitude to my parents for having chosen
it as our home, and gratitude to Kew Gardens for being a wonderful village within a city.
As a result, I dedicate this thesis to my parents, Julio César Preciado Duarte and Jeannette
Esperanza Ovalle Rodriguez, and to my sister, Natalia E. Preciado Ovalle for collectively
building a wonderful home together and for their boundless love and support throughout
the years. I also dedicate this thesis to Ciudad Jardín in Bogotá and lastly to Kew Gardens
in New York City. I hope my work proves fruitful in advancing preservation efforts in
Kew Gardens and in furthering conversations in the field of preservation.
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The Cities Inside Us
We live in secret cities
And we travel unmapped roads.
We speak words between us that we recognize
But which cannot be looked up.
They are our words.
They come from very far inside our mouths.
You and I, we are the secret citizens of the city
Inside us, and inside us
There go all the cars we have driven
And seen, there are all the people
We know and have known, there
Are all the places that are
But which used to be as well. This is where
They went. They did not disappear.
-Alberto Rios, 1952
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Section 1 – Reappropriating Privatism

Introduction
In his seminal publication Garden Cities of To-Morrow, published in 1902,
Ebenezer Howard laid out his utopian vision for a place where city might marry country,
and achieve a harmony that would cure society’s ills [Image 1].1 The ideas expounded in
that work have been misunderstood over the decades, but have had wide-reaching
implications in urban planning and policy, in particular in the rise of private communities
and community design. While true garden cities – those that adhere strictly to Howard’s
expansive vision – are relatively few and far between, it is beneficial to revisit his work
and use elements of his vision to search for contemporary solutions to several ills that
plague our cities and societies today. Indeed, today we live in a world similar to the Gilded
Age that Howard knew: extreme income inequality that corresponds to the rise of
homelessness, lack of affordable housing, the loss of civic and community participation,
displacement and gentrification, tenement-like squalid conditions in major cities, the loss
of historic built fabric, rampant speculative development, and a veritable global
environmental crisis whose lasting effects we still fail to fathom.2 The proposals laid out

1

Originally titled To-morrow: a Peaceful Path to Real Reform and published in 1898.
For examples see among scores of books and articles, Edward T. O’Donnell, “Are We Living in
the Gilded Age 2.0?” History, June 15, 2018, https://www.history.com/news/second-gilded-ageincome-inequality; Roberg Gebelhoff, “We are living in a new gilded age. 2018 proves it.” The
Washington Post, December 28, 2018,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2018/12/28/we-are-living-new-gilded-age-provesit/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.926876fca02f; David Grusky, ed. The New Gilded Age: The
Critical Inequality Debates of Our Time (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012). Also see
Robert Putnam, “The Strange Disappearance of Civic America,” The American Prospect, Winter
1996, https://prospect.org/article/strange-disappearance-civic-america; Robert Putnam, Bowling
Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2000).
2

1

in this work attempt to address several of these afflictions, and have been inspired by my
education and advocacy work in New York City, along with my socioeconomic and
political views and my desires for a more equitable and democratic society. They are
grounded in preservation because of the importance of place in shaping and conserving
stable communities, and of giving back to stakeholders. Private preservation is the main
theme of this thesis, and its ramifications are wide-reaching. In proposing the wider use of
privatism in preservation, we must revisit past ideas and the trajectory of their application
through the last century.
F. J. Osborn, the disciple of Howard in the New Towns Movement, wrote in a 1965
introduction to Garden Cities that Howard was a pragmatist who “was as much concerned
for free enterprise as for social control; and his experimental attitude and tentative
suggestions as to the boundary between the two, as to devolution of democratic control,
and as to the sphere of voluntary co-operation, are relevant to our present situation.”3 Truly
this quote applies today as well – the excesses of capitalism and the collapse of active civic
participation and democracy have taken a toll on our society that only moderation and new
solutions can mend. By searching for how communities can actively engage in saving their
built environment and heritage, they have the potential of saving themselves from
displacement, and stemming the tide of income inequality and the loss of place. By owning
the community assets themselves, communities can exert control over their use and benefit

See Peter Hall and Colin Ward, Sociable Cities: The Legacy of Ebenezer Howard (Chichester,
England: John Wiley & Sons, 1998), 104. See Celine d’Cruz and David Satterthwaite, “A Global
Perspective: Community-Driven Solutions to Urban Poverty,” in Breakthrough Communities:
Sustainability and Justice in the Next American Metropolis, ed. M. Paloma Pavel (Cambridge,
MA: The MIT Press, 2009), 347-348.
3
F. J. Osborn, “Preface” in Garden Cities of To-morrow, by Ebenezer Howard, ed. F. J. Osborn
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1965), 11.
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financially from them. These are not new ideas – they have been widely used over the past
century in the form of private communities (or common-interest developments, also known
as CIDs), and land trusts in the form of real estate investment trusts (REITs). Looking at
Howard’s vision for harmonious, livable, democratic, and equitable cities will allow us to
understand how we can reappropriate these tools in order to achieve historic preservation
goals that simultaneously address socioeconomic problems that we face today. To that end,
it is important to recognize that the main inspiration for this thesis has been my own work
in community history and preservation advocacy in my New York City communities.
These are the Victorian, garden suburb of Richmond Hill, the planned garden suburb of
Kew Gardens, where I grew up, and the world-famous private planned garden city-inspired
garden suburb of Forest Hills Gardens. The three neighborhoods are all located in central
Queens, and are immediately adjacent to each other [Image 2]. The developers and
community builders who envisioned and built these places were inspired by Howard’s
vision, which gives them a shared history. This is a shared heritage of being sites where
community builders implemented Progressive Era ideas that addressed broader social
purposes, more than just housing itself.
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, several developers in the
Borough of Queens in New York City built garden-suburb developments to attract
Manhattanites tired of crowded and sordid living conditions. These three neighborhoods
reflect a significant history of real estate development, and tell a story of preservation
attempts and solutions, with varying degrees of success. Richmond Hill was a Victorian
railroad-suburb subdivided and developed by the Man family, and was recently listed on
the National Register of Historic Places as a historic district, after decades of community
3

activism.4 Kew Gardens was a planned garden community developed by the same family
in the early twentieth century, and Forest Hills Gardens was developed by the Russell Sage
Foundation with an architectural masterplan by Grosvenor Atterbury and landscape plan
by Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr.
The preservation stories and solutions for these three communities fall along a
broad spectrum: Richmond Hill has applied for local historic district designation at least
four times, and has been denied as many even though the community desires protection.
Kew Gardens homeowners have been very ambivalent about preservation because of
property rights issues, but the neighborhood is home to a strong activist and preservationist
community. Finally, Forest Hills Gardens has been very well preserved because it is a
private community which uses restrictive covenants to enforce and maintain the
community, all handled by the Forest Hills Gardens Corporation. These three communities
and examples are historically significant because of their planning and architecture, and
moreover because they serve as inspiration and potential testing grounds for innovative
preservation solutions that may have wider application in the fields of historic preservation,
city planning, and urban design; simultaneously they help inspire policy that addresses
heritage concerns and socioeconomic issues.
Joining and using the precedents and visions outlined by Howard and these three
communities as sources of inspiration, this thesis aims to suggest extra-governmental
preservation solutions. The search for a set of private preservation solutions comes from a
frustration with the citywide (public) preservation commission in New York City, its
4

Michael Shain, “Now, Richmond Hill is History,” The Queens Chronicle, December 13, 2018,
http://www.qchron.com/editions/queenswide/now-richmond-hill-is-history/article_7d9a5983ce70-5371-9f10-be8349ca7d5f.html.
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shortcomings, and the preservation landscape overall, which is discussed in greater detail
in section 5.5 Therefore, my research will focus on proposing a set of private preservation
solutions, one legal and one economic that form the basis for the privatization of
regulations and land ownership and management. These two solutions go hand in hand,
and reflect the reappropriation and adaptation of Howard’s vision of internal, selfregulation within a community and communal ownership and control of land and resources.
The tools and scenarios ultimately suggest favorable economic situations geared toward
preserving built heritage while promoting socioeconomic equity.

Private Property and Communal Land Ownership Solutions
The legal and economic proposals are meant to be used either individually or
together in any community that desires to achieve private preservation goals and advance
community equity through such communal land or property ownership. The basis for the
legal solutions have been used as a recourse by community builders and developers of
private communities and governments in the form of CIDs for decades now; these refer to
easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes, or more generally, the Covenants,
Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) that a community uses. Section 3 will further
expound upon these terms, their historic use, and their limitations. Ultimately the first

5

For example, “Defending Historic Preservation in New York City,” Historic Districts Council,
December 1, 2017, https://hdc.org/policy/help-save-the-landmarks-law/; Anna Clark, “Fight to
Preserve Historic Preservation Tools for Cities,” NextCity, February 18, 2016,
https://nextcity.org/daily/entry/michigan-historic-preservation-historic-districts-act; Craig Hubert,
“Preservationists Raise Alarm on Proposed Landmarks Rule Changes,” Brownstoner, March 21,
2018, https://www.brownstoner.com/architecture/landmarks-rule-changes-lpc-proposal-masgreenwich-village-landmarks-preservation-commission/; Tanay Warerkar, “LPC, Gansevoort
Street developers sued by advocacy group,” Curbed NY, October 18, 2016,
https://ny.curbed.com/2016/10/18/13322026/gansevoort-street-redevelopment-lawsuit.

5

proposal is a system wherein preservation-minded neighbors would impose private
contracts and deed restrictions upon their own properties, allowing their neighbors to
regulate and enforce preservation easements or covenants even after the sale of the
property. This might be expanded gradually among neighbors and eventually lead to the
establishment of a type of homeowners’ association on an existing neighborhood that selfregulates for a preservation outcome when the public sphere will not or cannot enforce the
preservation of the properties.6 Alternatively, it could lead to the establishment of a
neighborhood-based preservation easement-holding trust or association – both of these
ideas will be discussed in greater detail later on.
In addition to these legal recourses, the economic proposal is likewise inspired from
Howard’s vision and subsequent applications regarding community ownership of land.
This vision affected the growth of land trusts in this country and around the world, both as
conservation land trusts and Community Land Trusts (CLTs that preserve affordable
housing), concepts explained in section 4. Using this legacy, this thesis’s economic
proposal represents an attempt to provide equitable and preservation-minded real estate
development. Community members would purchase shares in properties as a solid real
estate investment akin to a Real Estate Investment Trust (REIT). This proposal’s ultimate
goals would be the establishment of an investment that pays dividends back to the
community and the creation of an innovative preservation solution.
Using my own activism and Howard’s vision as inspiration, these two proposed
solutions represent essentially private preservation solutions. The aim is to give individuals
6

Robert H. Nelson has written extensively on the potential of having existing neighborhoods be
able to privatize. Robert H. Nelson, Private Neighborhoods and the Transformation of Local
Government (Washington, D.C.; Urban Institute Press, 2005), 265-278.

6

and communities the power to have a significant voice in the future of their communities
outside of the public regulatory framework of zoning ordinances, which include historic
districts and landmarks. The economic proposal addresses significant issues of equity and
community ownership, allowing residents to remain in the community, make a profit, and
preserve their heritage. There are of course significant downsides to private solutions,
ranging from homeowner concerns about property values, to the high transaction costs
regarding social, economic, and political challenges that surface when trying to get
community support. These challenges and drawbacks will be discussed in section 5, which
looks at the nascent solutions in practice.

Problems with Public Preservation
These real-life complications which I will elucidate in section 5 derive partly from
an additional problem within the realm of historic preservation, which is a dependence on
the public realm to provide protection and regulation of historic sites.7 Throughout the
United States, local municipalities designate landmarks or historic districts, and protect and
regulate their alteration through their historical commissions. At the national level, the
National Parks Service administers the National Register of Historic Places, and national
landmarks, sites or districts listed on the register receive an important honor, but not
protections from alterations or demolitions.8 With respect to the three aforementioned

7

Although the public realm has saved thousands of places in this country and is still extremely
valuable and necessary, there are significant barriers that preservationists face – for instance, we
are often pitted against developers as being anti-growth or taking away property rights. A private
alternative might lessen the potency of such attacks and give preservation more power of
persuasion.
8
“Frequently Asked Questions,” National Park Service, August 29, 2018,
https://www.nps.gov/subjects/nationalhistoriclandmarks/faqs.htm.

7

Queens communities, the principle issue in New York City is currently the politically and
bureaucratically complex and fraught issue of nominating properties or districts to the local
register. Moreover, in recent years, preservationists in New York have argued that the
Landmarks Preservation Commission (LPC) has been derelict in its duty to save landmarkworthy buildings and neighborhoods.9 Furthermore, preservationists have argued that the
last couple of administrations, those of Mayor Bill de Blasio and Mayor Michael
Bloomberg, have been increasingly pro-development, to the detriment of historic sites.10
Despite this, a city as large and attractive to newcomers and developers as New York must
balance development and preservation. In addition, significant preservation hurdles lie not
with government but with communities themselves; for instance, Kew Gardens itself is
divided between staunch preservationist and anti-landmarking groups of residents and
homeowners, creating a situation where there is no consensus or latitude to proceed with
nominations or gain political support. This stands in contrast to Richmond Hill, a tight-knit
community where homeowners have desired protection for almost thirty years but have

9

Craig Hubert, “Shaken by Recent Decisions, Preservationists Say Landmarks Commission is
Not Doing Its Job,” Brownstoner, January 25, 2018,
https://www.brownstoner.com/architecture/landmarks-preservation-commission-historiclandmarking-meenakshi-srinivasan/. For instance, this article explains a new trend where the LPC
takes “no action” on proposed alterations, and that there may be ulterior motives at play: “Some
believe that, under the guise of “no action” decisions, the LPC is merely presenting a false
formality. According to one preservationist who wished not to be named, developers are aware
that a “no action” means they are on the right track. In the past, many of these “no action”
decisions would be denied, or the LPC would require substantial changes before approval was
granted.” At the same time, another critique was that “ ‘The LPC won’t designate buildings
because they are too altered, but will allow alterations to buildings that are designated.’”
10
J. David Goodman and William Neuman, “Can New York City’s Mayor Be an Amazon
Booster and Still be Progressive?” The New York Times, November 16, 2018,
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/16/nyregion/mayor-de-blasio-amazon-progressive-nyc.html;
Evan Bindelglass, “Landmarks Preservation Commissioner Chair stepping down from her post,”
Curbed NY, April 19, 2018, https://ny.curbed.com/2018/4/19/17257778/landmarks-preservationcommission-chair-resignation.

8

been denied by the LPC for purportedly “lacking character” or “a sense of place,” among
other reasons further explained in section 5.11
Having recognized these broad societal and specific preservation problems, this
thesis will identify and analyze Howard’s lasting and influential role in the creation of
private communities and land trusts. Among the main sources will be Howard’s own work,
and other scholars’ analyses of Garden Cities and garden suburbs; scholarship on the rise
of private communities; histories and testimonials derived from interviews and
conversations with community members regarding preservation in the three Queens
communities; scholars’ work regarding the use of investment trusts and land trusts; and
explanations of concepts in property law to better understand the private nature of these
solutions. Ultimately this thesis proposes a reappropriation of past ideas and a new
application of contemporary legal structures (namely CIDs and REITs) to understand how
a contemporary application might be achievable – one that not only preserves the built
environment for communities through the private sphere, but gives back to people through
a vision of communal ownership in land and investment in people and places.

11

Such reasons include former lack of elected representative support and lack of funding for a
thorough preservation nomination. These will be further explained in section 5.
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Section 2 – Historical Background and the Rise of Private Governments
Introduction
In Garden Cities of To-morrow, Ebenezer Howard described his pioneering vision
as one which would “be carried out by those who have not a merely pious opinion, but an
effective belief in the economic, sanitary, and social advantages of common ownership of
land…”12 His was a radical vision wherein people might live in peace and harmony with
nature (the garden) and society (the city), and included industrial and agricultural
surroundings to provide stable jobs, food, and the pleasures of the countryside.13 His
utopian vision was influenced by his lower middle-class childhood, his work as a farmhand
in Nebraska, and his time in Chicago, during which he first encountered the problems
caused by high values of urban real estate.14 After the ‘Great Depression’ of 1876, Howard
understood that laissez-faire capitalism caused by international trade interests had begun
destroying the traditional agricultural system in Britain.15 His observations of life in
Chicago, New York, and London created within him a desire to cure society of its ills.
Howard was influenced by many writers and concepts, grabbing ideas on green belts,
regional city complexes, industry in cities, the Back to the Land movement from past
influential men such as Henry George, Peter Kropotkin, Thomas Spence, Alfred Marshall,

12

Ebenezer Howard, Garden Cities of To-Morrow, originally published 1902 (Cambridge, MA:
The MIT Press, 1965), 106.
13
Kate Henderson, Katy Lock, Hugh Ellis, The Art of Building a Garden City: Designing New
Communities for the 21st Century (Newcastle upon Tyne: RIBA Publishing, 2017), 15.
14
Robert Beevers, The Garden City Utopia: A Critical Biography of Ebenezer Howard (New
York: St. Martin’s Press, 1988), 2-7.
15
Ibid., 9. Among these problematic interests were “the ascendancy of the manufacturing
interest…, the principle of free trade to the status of natural law,” and the mass migration of
people to the cities.
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and Edward Bellamy, among others.16 Henry George’s ‘single tax’ on landlord’s rent
formed the financial foundation for the Garden City’s socioeconomic reforms, to serve the
public at large, not private individuals.17 Howard did not wish to destroy the system, but
reform it to serve the public good, a goal worthy of imitation in these similar times.18
Howard’s innovative conception of the socialism that should serve as the
foundation of this new society was not one where the government was the largest and
ultimately the only employer and monopoly.19 He saw inspiration in Edward Bellamy’s
Looking Backward, which led him to believe in the potential of a society “freed by
socialism…a Christian society, imbued with a spirit of co-operation and harmony, by
contrast with that of capitalism…”20 Indeed, Howard’s vision was that a peaceful
1616

Ibid., 17. Howard was for instance influenced by Henry George’s single tax on landlord’s
rent. Peter Hall writes that it was reading Bellamy’s Looking Backward which joined all of
Howard’s ideas, but that Howard rejected Bellamy’s centralized socialist management because it
seemed authoritarian. Peter Hall, Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning
and Design Since 1880, 4th ed. (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2014), 92.
17
Central to Howard’s “economic and social reforms [was Henry George’s] unearned increment,
[which] secured for public rather than private uses, would support it all.” The unearned increment
was an increase in property values without the owner having invested in it. Taxing this unearned
increment would therefore equitably benefit all community members. Beevers, The Garden City
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agricultural estate, will form out of rates compulsorily levied.” Howard, Garden Cities, 81. All
these municipal undertakings and improvements would be by and for the community; Howard
repeatedly states that there would only be “one landlord, and this the community,” which would
grow and serve its own members. Ibid., 88.
18
Howard Gillette, Jr. agreed, writing that although planners and developers failed to incorporate
Howard’s social vision into new communities, the social impact is worthy of study and
emulation: “shorn of adequate public financial support and directed to other often profit-oriented
ends, those efforts typically failed to achieve the broad social goals they were intended to attain,
but the record of their goals and philosophy remains for a new generation of critics and designers
to adapt.” Howard Gillette, Jr., Civitas by Design: Building Better Communities, from the Garden
City to the New Urbanism (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2010.) 44.
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20
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revolution might bring about a new civilization that would supplant exploitative capitalism
and which was based on mutual cooperation.21 It is this privatism that aims for the public
good which is the focus of this thesis. While present researchers have written about
Howard’s ideal versus the reality of private communities today,22 this thesis joins other
researchers in proposing that it is possible for privatism to work towards the goal of public
ownership, control, and benefit of property.23

Rate-Rent
To finance his Garden City, Howard came up with the rate-rent system, which came
from capital borrowed at a rate to be paid back by the residents themselves, who became
the owners of the entire land through trustees: “ ‘we will secure for ourselves an honest
landlord, namely ourselves,’” wrote Howard in Commonsense Socialism (1892).24 This
rate-rent allowed residents to be freed from “landlordism” and to create a sinking fund to
lower the rate itself and fund future public works and services. Instead of any income tax,
only a ground rent would be paid to the trustees, who would reinvest it in the principal
endowment of sorts, and with the interest, reinvest it in the same community.25 Some of
21

Gillette, Civitas by Design, 23. Howard for instance encouraged the establishment of a limiteddividend company, thereby reducing the worst of that exploitative and speculative capitalism.
Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 93.
22
Evan McKenzie, Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private
Government (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 7-8.
23
See for example the exhortation that Randall Mason gives towards searching for new models of
(communal) land ownership to advance preservation causes. Randall Mason, “A New Ownership
Culture: Concepts, Policies, and Institutions for the Future of Preservation,” in Bending the
Future: 50 Ideas for the Next 50 Years of Historic Preservation in the United States, ed. Max
Page and Marla R. Miller (Amherst, MA: University of Massachusetts Press, 2016), 157-161.
24
Beevers, The Garden City, 32.
25
Fred E. Foldvary, “Proprietary Communities and Community Associations,” in The Voluntary
City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society, ed. David T. Beito, Peter Gordon, and Alexander
Tabarrok (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2002), 274.
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Howard’s contemporaries called these plans socialistic because of the element of common
land ownership, through which a cooperative land company would purchase the land,
improve, and manage it.
However, Howard feared moving too far left and creating similar centralization and
monopoly, which would have destroyed economic diversity and vibrancy.26 The middle
course he took was his Garden City, and the economic system the ‘local option;’ with this
basis he spelled out in greater detail the logistics of his invention. Instead of wanting to
join individuals into a larger organization, his proposal appealed “not only to individuals
but to co-operators, manufacturers, philanthropic societies, and others… and with
organizations under their control, to come and place themselves under conditions involving
no new restraints but rather securing wider freedom.”27 Such cooperation sought to reduce
wealth concentration in a minority’s hands, and would be accomplished through the
common land ownership, profit sharing, and cooperative shops.28 This voluntary joining of
individuals and groups agreeing to be placed under a common control with conditions
would be adopted by community builders and developers in the United States throughout
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries in the creation of private communities. While not
exactly as Howard envisioned, this legacy of privatism has left significant and sometimes
problematic precedents on housing policy in this country.
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Ibid., 38-39. Evan McKenzie calls Howard’s proposal a “democratically controlled corporate
technocracy,” with a constitutional that looked more like a corporation’s business charter instead
of a municipality’s composition; furthermore, experts would manage the city not through political
ideology but through reason and logic. McKenzie, Privatopia, 5.
27
Howard, Garden Cities, 116.
28
Gillette, Civitas by Design, 24. Howard argued that “if the example were set of profit-sharing,
this might grow into a custom, and the distinction between master and servant would be gradually
lost in the simple process of all becoming co-operators.” Howard, Garden Cities, 98-101.
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From the beginning of his fundraising efforts, Howard faced the problem of low
enthusiasm due to the risk of communal land ownership, and he gradually had to make
difficult concessions from his ambitious ideas of social equity in order to fund the first
Garden City at Letchworth.29 Architecturally, this new city was designed by Raymond
Unwin and Barry Parker, who used a medieval- and John Ruskin-inspired, Arts and Crafts
aesthetic in the new buildings. This aesthetic became the standard for many garden cities
throughout Britain and the United States – an oasis of neo-Tudor and revivalist
architectural works set in a verdant landscape. In several of these cases, the craftsmanship
and building costs became so high that they ultimately prohibited the working classes for
whom they were intended.

Shell of a Vision
Moreover, the main problem became that the physical designs overtook the original
and intended social agenda of cooperation.30 Howard’s main concern was never the
architecture of the planned garden city, but the social life and systems of the community.31
As the revivalist, Arts and Crafts architecture took a stronger hold of the new garden cities
and the later garden suburbs, Howard’s social visions were being ignored and not put into
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Gillette, Civitas by Design, 27. George Bernard Shaw, one of the Garden City’s early
supporters, predicted that funders and directors (who wanted instant profits) would not be
amenable to the 5% dividend limit and distribution of their profits, and that the only solution
might be to nationalize the garden city. Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 99.
30
“It soon became clear… that the romantic socialism and pre-industrial vernacular aesthetic of
the arts and crafts movement meshed rather neatly with Howard’s concept of the garden city.”
Stephen V. Ward, The Peaceful Path: Building Garden Cities and New Towns (Hertfordshire:
Hertfordshire Press, 2016), 26.
31
Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 95.

14

play, largely as a result of the fundraising and construction expenses.32 The openness of the
plan, the beauty of the architecture with its cottages, town halls, and village greens, and the
immersion in nature all made these garden cities easy to replicate in form at least, which
other developers and community builders did with alacrity. Consistently, later garden cities
and suburbs had such high design standards that mainly only the upper-classes could afford
to live there.33
Although the garden city architects, Uwin and Parker, also wanted to achieve social
ends, they instead achieved great beauty in architectural and civic design in the garden
cities and then in the first garden city-inspired garden suburb at Hampstead. This suburb
was not a true garden city because it lacked industry and was anchored to London by virtue
of proximity.34 While they had their early origins in late-eighteenth-century England, the
garden suburbs only really flourished in the late nineteenth century and exploded in the
twentieth, taking on Howard’s garden cities’ look and applying it to urban contexts in many
cases.35 A great deal of misuse in the semantics of the two types – garden cities and garden
suburbs – can be attributed to the success of Howard’s creation; nonetheless they remain
at heart different creations with a shared history and look. Howard’s invention and vision
became so widespread and popular that the general public began to misuse it to refer to
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“As Robert Fishman has commented, instead of a peaceful alternative to capitalism, the Garden
City became a device for preserving it,” and later on: “What survived from all this was, however,
a watered-down essence of the Howard vision.” Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 100.
33
Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 102-103.
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Hampsted prices inevitably rose, and “the objective, ‘day-to-day coexistence which would
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even the tiny artisans’ cottages are well and truly gentrified.” Hall Cities of Tomorrow, 107.
35
Robert A. M. Stern, David Fishman, and Jacob Tilove, Paradise Planned: The Garden Suburb
and the Modern City (New York: The Monacelli Press, 2013), 11.
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actual garden suburbs, which lacked industry or were purely residential areas, and were
dependent upon a nearby major city.36
Howard’s own supporters realized the financial difficulties of encouraging public
land ownership by and for the people, and thus the garden suburb became a more attractive
alternative with more realistic goals than the socially ambitious garden city.37 The attractive
Arts and Crafts aesthetic amid copious greenery was copied throughout the world in
subsequent garden ‘cities,’ but the actual intent was thoroughly diluted.38 The ideas of
walkability and traditional, revivalist architectural styles were emulated by American
influencers such as Lewis Mumford, Henry Wright, and Clarence Stein, who established
the Regional Planning Association of America in 1923 to promote the garden cities in the
United States. While the first official attempt at creating a garden city was in Radburn, NJ,
there was already a legacy in the United States of garden suburbs. Nonetheless, while
innovative in design and its attempt at decentralization from New York, Radburn did not
make use of the crucial and core socioeconomic transformations that Howard had
advocated in his work, and therefore was also not a true garden city but a suburb.39
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“Garden suburbs, in short, were conceived as parts or dependencies of large cities; garden cities
were intended to be largely self-sufficient.” Stern, Paradise Planned, 203.
37
Hall, Cities of Tomorrow, 109.
38
Henderson, Lock, and Ellis, Art of Building a Garden City, 20-23.
39
While Radburn was innovative for separating the pedestrian and the car, its promoters hoped
for the creation of a vibrant community aided by the nonprofit Radburn Association, and it was
hoped that an egalitarian community might naturally grow out of it. The Depression destroyed
any other ambitions for Radburn, including the aim of self-sufficiency. Gillette, Civitas by
Design, 35-36.
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Forest Hills Gardens
One of the most important of these garden city-influenced garden suburbs was
Forest Hills Gardens, begun in 1910 under the auspices of the Russell Sage Foundation. It
was here that many of the idealistic architectural designs and motifs [Image 3] were
perfected by Grosvenor Atterbury and Frederick Law Olmsted Jr., and yet again, its
planners could not achieve its original, altruistic aims.40 Instead, Forest Hills Gardens
almost immediately became a community for the upper middle class, as it remains to this
day. What has helped preserve its architectural beauty, plan, and greenery, is its private
legal, contractual nature and its private architectural review process. As a result, the
community was one of the first to successfully demonstrate the power of private legal
protections for the preservation of property, ideas that guide this very thesis. Similar to
Radburn, the hope in Forest Hills Gardens was that good design and civic spaces would
naturally “enhance and sustain a vital civic life,” without the radical social transformation
that Howard advocated but his successors could not feasibly implement.41
As a garden-city inspired garden suburb, Forest Hills Gardens shares that important
legacy with Kew Gardens, which was also founded in 1910, but which did not have the
advantage of a bespoke masterplan. In addition, Richmond Hill, the oldest of the three
(founded 1869) was an early railroad suburb, again sharing in that legacy of community
builders who aspired to create a wholesome and united community. All three of these
communities made use of deed restrictions to regulate the use and look of all buildings in
the community. These truly were just three examples of what community builders were

40
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Stern, Paradise Planned, 140.
Gillette, Civitas by Design, 24.
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doing throughout the United States in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries;
their evolution helps us understand the legacy of Howard’s vision, how it could not
completely take hold in a capitalist society, and how a derivative vision of it took hold in
the development of private communities.42

Literature Review
In this way, this thesis follows in the work of historians such as Marc A. Weiss,
who looked at that rise in the power of community builders, and of Evan McKenzie, who
was among the first to write about the connection between Howard’s utopian vision for the
garden cities and development realities. Weiss looked into how early twentieth century
‘community builders’ saw themselves as having an important job in building cities and
wielded great power through private planning, during a time when city planning as a field
was still in its infancy.43 Developers in the twentieth century resorted to private legal
property law solutions such as easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes (to be
explained in the following section) to establish Common Interest Developments (CIDs)
and private governments to protect homeowners and developments from undesirable and
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Although Richmond Hill predates Howard’s ideas, it forms part of the larger legacy of socialimpact oriented developers who believed in community institutions and the social aspects of
housing. Community builders set themselves apart from speculative developers because they
designed, engineered, financed, developed, and marketed purely residential areas and urban
environments through private innovation and vision. In particular before the advent of zoning
regulations, community builders tightly controlled their new developments through private legal
means as a way to ensure stability in who lived there and in property values. See Marc A. Weiss,
The Rise of the Community Builders: The American Real Estate Industry and Urban Land
Planning (Washington, D.C.: Beard Books, 2002), 1-4.
43
Ibid., 68-70.
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uncontrolled change.44 These legacies will be explored in the next section, along with the
historic problems with private government, and their potential for use in existing
communities.
McKenzie shed light on the legacy of Howard’s vision and the reality that
community builders imposed on their new developments in order to protect their interests.
In Privatopia, McKenzie laid out the view that private communities are illiberal, present a
false choice to homeowners, are problematic because they represent the privatization of
formerly municipal systems, and have too much power, through which they take away
homeowners’ rights.45 In general, his scholarship presents a critical view, in light of many
of the legitimate negative effects that Common Interest Communities can have on their
homeowners and democracy at large.46 These deleterious symptoms include overregulation
of allowable activities to and on the properties, including new aesthetic choices, the display
of political signs and flags, among others – actions that result in the imposition of fines,
liens on the property, or litigation.47 These are legitimate concerns with private
overregulation, and libertarian scholars such as Robert H. Nelson would counter by saying
that individuals voluntarily choose such strict regulation for the benefit of stability.48
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McKenzie writes: “The use of such traditional methods of real estate development instead of
the potentially revolutionary concept of public ownership placated possible investors and
homeowners.” McKenzie, Privatopia, 48-49.
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Indeed, a parallel with historic preservation would be that the protection through a
landmark designation of a property ‘burdens’ the property owner with regulations on
aesthetic concerns – a regulatory system that some choose to enter willingly while others
do not. Either way, historic preservation is now accepted as a legitimate and compelling
public interest, and such a compelling interest can be transferred over to the private realm.
While McKenzie aptly narrates the history and trajectory of private governments
and housing, he consistently acknowledges the utopian roots in Howard’s ideas and
references Nelson, who stands at the opposing spectrum regarding increasing privatism in
property. Nelson advocates for the increasing offloading of municipal services to private
communities, and envisions the ultimate demise of zoning in favor of private community
associations, which he argues can be more democratic and equitable.49 McKenzie
acknowledges that Howard and Nelson correctly identified “an alternative form of political
and social organization [that] could bring about broad social and political change.”50
Therefore, while the literature on the rise of homeowners associations and private
communities is still quite young, this thesis engages in a conversation around these topics
for the preservation of people and the built environment, joining a small group of political
scientists and economists who have begun exploring the effects of these community groups
within the last forty years.51
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Among the most influential scholars seeking to analyze what the privatism of
property tells us about our society is Fred E. Foldvary. Writing as an economist on the
political right, Foldvary has written a useful historiography on the rise of private
communities and what other scholars have to say about them, and ultimately concludes that
the issue at heart is not a “market versus government” situation, but whether the governance
is imposed (public) or voluntary (private).52 Indeed, he categorizes proprietary governance
as being characterized by unified ownership, versus democratic governance, which is
characterized by an “association of co-owners.”53 He further more argues that residents of
private communities are unfairly doubly taxed, that it is excessive governmental regulation
that diminishes consumer free choice, and that private communities have the potential of
helping reform all government.54

see the advent of increased privatism in communities and the rise of voluntary associations in
reaction to government as a public good to be further encouraged. It is part of a much larger
sociopolitical and economic debate about the future of our economic systems, voluntary
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Samer Bagaeen and Ola Uduku, (London: Earthscan, 2010), 1-7. For another great source on
international case studies, see several chapters in Private Cities: Global and Local Perspectives,
ed. Georg Glasze, Chris Webster, and Klaus Frantz, (London: Routledge, 2006). McKenzie,
Privatopia, 22. See David T. Beito, Peter Gordon, and Alexander Tabarrok, “Toward a Rebirth of
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From another perspective, economist Spencer Heath MacCallum sees problems
with both extremes – total governmental control or total privatism – and proposes an
alternative system of land-leasing, a “nonpolitical approach to neighborhood organization
long employed in commercial real estate,” which harks back to Howard’s original rent-rate
system.55 He gives as his main examples commercial developments with multiple tenants,
such as malls, hotels, or even a few land trusts, all of which have one landlord/owner and
multiple leases; these are Multiple-Tenant Income Properties (MTIPs), as he calls them,
which are basically estates that are not subdivided, as the more common CIDs are.56
MacCallum’s proposal for a faithful return to Howard’s land-lease system would
signify a true system of common ownership of land, akin to a for-profit land trust, discussed
later on in section 4. The current and extremely popular system of private governments
does not actually represent common ownership of all the land; instead the way it functions
is that individual property owners buy a property or unit and are contractually bound
through an association to pay dues that go towards maintaining the common areas and
systems.57 Despite the legitimate criticisms of undemocratic methods of regulation and
concerns that these governments have too much power and that there is a false choice when
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MacCallum, “The Case for Land Lease,” 372.
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owners buy into these communities, many people continue to look to private communities,
because in essence they protect private property through internal regulatory frameworks.58

Private Communities and Community Builders
These frameworks were first used in the nineteenth century in elite neighborhoods
for the very wealthy to protect and preserve their property interests. The first such private
community organizations to be formed were in Gramercy Park in New York City (1831),
where the developer placed the park space’s title in the hands of trustees [Image 4]; and
Louisburg Square, in Boston (1844), where wealthy homeowners placed restrictions and
covenants upon their own deeds to self-regulate and protect the open land in perpetuity
[Image 5]. However, in the nineteenth century, restrictive covenants did not involve an
external organization to regulate them, and instead ran for a limited number of years;
furthermore, homeowners wishing to enforce a covenant had to bring litigation against
another homeowner independently, which was financially and socially costly. 59
It wasn’t until the twentieth century when community builders began
experimenting with the creation of mandatory homeowners associations for homeowners,
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and following in the steps of Progressive Era thinking brought about a desire from
community builders to protect their developments and future property values in the era
before zoning.60 At Forest Hills Gardens, the Russell Sage Corporation surrendered control
after the last properties were sold off in the 1920s, and residents agreed to regulate
themselves internally through the Forest Hills Gardens Corporation.61 In the same decade,
the planned community of Radburn was begun (1929), where city planner and lawyer
Charles Ascher found the legal solution for the creation of a private government through
contract – a privatized version of the Progressive Era-inspired council-manager system.62
The National Association of Real Estate Boards (founded in 1908) supported the expanded
application of these private legal solutions and governments in new developments, and
with Ascher, community builders were able to create permanent and self-perpetuating legal
entities now known as Homeowners’ Associations (HOAs). While the intent for some
community builders in Forest Hills Gardens and Radburn may have been the garden city
ideal based on common land ownership, this was never truly achieved in residential
communities in this country, primarily due to the wide cultural and political opposition to
common land ownership the strong encouragement of private home ownership instead of
tenancy.63
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To understand the legal basis for the creation of these private governments and
communities, and the justification for their continued existence and success in the courts,
we must now look at the property law explanations regarding easements, real covenants,
and equitable servitudes. These tools have been used in the past century to protect private
interests and communities, to restrict access to certain social and racial groups, and have
been strengthened by the American judicial system. Ultimately, we shall explore their
potential to be used as a private preservation solution.

American Cities: Private Power and Public Policy (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1979),
171-172.

25

Section 3 – Private Communities in Action
Introduction
The three main types of private associations that exist through contractual
agreements among private residents in a community are Homeowners Associations,
condominiums, and co-operatives.64 As types of corporations, these private governments
have total legal rights, limited liability, a long lifespan, and the specific purpose of
protecting private property values.65 They share the following characteristics: common
ownership of certain areas and private ownership of specific units; a ‘constitution’ for the
association to legally exist, with rules and bylaws; and mandatory membership upon
purchase of property in said community association that manages the communal property
and regulates individual units.

Condominiums and Homeowners Associations
There are significant differences among these types. For one, condominiums refer
to ownership, not type of property (they can be apartments or detached houses, although
they most often do refer to apartments); in this system, people own their individual unit in
full title, plus a portion or undivided interest of ownership in the communal spaces.66 A
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Several names exist for Homeowners Associations, including Community Associations,
Common Interest Developments, Common Interest Communities, or Planned Unit Developments,
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Homeowners Association (or a CID) in this way is a type of condominium, but is very
often characterized by detached houses and a series of amenities for residents (such as
pools, tennis courts, police, etc.). Furthermore, in a CID, the association owns all the
common elements, whereas in a condominium, the association owns nothing but manages
the commons. In a condominium setting, each member instead owns their unit and a share
of the commons, which are owned by all collectively.67 The governing documents for the
association includes covenants, conditions, and restrictions (CC&Rs) which run with the
land (not individual homeowners), bylaws, and rules and regulations which give the
association contractual power to enforce restrictions in court. These are recorded as a
declaration or master deed in the municipal register of deeds before units sell, and all
subsequent purchasers agree to the CC&Rs by contractual consent.68
In these HOAs or condominium associations, residents elect a board of trustees to
oversee the management, operation and regulation of the community, and only property
owners get votes, disenfranchising the rest of the family unit and renters. The payment of
monthly dues by residents funds the association, which uses those funds for the
community’s upkeep and for potential litigation costs if and when residents break the
covenants and restrictions.69
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Cooperatives
In addition to condominiums, there are cooperatives, which mainly exist in
apartment buildings in New York City and Chicago, and are rarely created now. The first
cooperative was The Rembrandt in New York, built in 1881 and which housed artists who
could tolerate the radical co-op concept of controlling expenses together and internally
monitoring themselves.70 Cooperative apartment buildings became more widespread and
were known as ‘home clubs’ for a while. After the 1920s, wealthy New Yorkers were
drawn to the cooperative living arrangements because of the exclusivity, with co-op boards
screening potential residents, a policy that survives to this day. The New York Housing
Act of 1927 spurred the development of low- and middle-class cooperatives, but the Great
Depression destroyed many of them.71 1940s legislation helped bring co-ops back, and
because of rising expenses, some landlords converted entire buildings to co-ops. The 1949
National Housing Act gave co-ops government insurance of mortgages, which helped the
development of new co-ops. The 1980s saw a boom in conversions because of rising
housing prices once more, and landlords were eager to make a profit by selling to residents
via conversions.72 After the 1987 market crash, cooperatives lost popularity, and
condominiums remain more popular than cooperatives throughout the country for various
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reasons, chief among them that they allow for unit-owners to rent them out and make a
profit.73
In co-ops, residents do not individually own their units, but instead own shares of
a corporation which holds the title to the entire development, including apartments and
commons. A resident, or tenant-stockholder, owns stock in the corporation and in addition
leases a unit from the corporation for the long-term.74 Part of the reason that cooperatives
are so unusual and limited to two major cities is because they are not actively promoted by
developer or government initiatives, or by financial institutions who would only lend one
mortgage to a cooperative under one united title instead of scores of mortgages for a
condominium.75 In addition, there is a discomfort that millions of people feel with not
owning a total interest in their property and instead leasing it. Culturally and aided by
federal administrations, it has been hard for Americans to accept this system of common
ownership through shareholding, but the popularity in apartment buildings in New York
reflects that it has more potential on a smaller scale.76
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Private Governments Functions and Concerns
All of these private governments have declarations which impose compulsory
restrictions on all residents that are legally enforced as real covenants and/or equitable
servitudes (the aforementioned CC&Rs); the declaration lists all units and common areas,
lists the government’s powers, creates procedures, compels the payment of dues and fees
(assessments), and lists in detail all restrictions on “use, appearance, construction, and…
transferability of units.”77 Many times there are so many restrictions that property owners
may afterwards regret having purchased the property, and there are opposing schools of
thought regarding the enforcing of such restrictions: as mentioned in the previous section,
some scholars posit that upon purchase, a buyer voluntarily surrenders certain freedoms
for the stability of the private community. Others believe that covenants are much more
coercive than voluntary, and that there is a false alternative, because the supposed
alternative not to adhere to the restrictions is not to purchase the property at all.78
Many people who buy into private communities do so because of a disenchantment
with and even distrust of public government and its ability to maintain and protect stable
communities.79 Moreover, private communities are able to protect the built environment
through their associations in a very strict and internal manner that makes the regulation and
enforcement much more localized than a municipality could ever achieve. Associations
achieved such incredible private regulatory power through a centuries-long development
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of English common law precedents, which reveals a pivotal historical trajectory and
applications of property law in novel land use situations.

Easements
The first legal framework important to understand is the easement, which
fundamentally is the right that one party possesses to use another’s land or property for a
specific purpose. Easements, as well as real covenants and equitable servitudes, are all
forms of servitudes, which are in the most basic definition, rights or obligations that run
with the land. Easements are divided into affirmative easements and negative easements;
affirmative easements give rights to use another’s land for a specific reason.80 Negative
easements are “restrictions with respect to what owners can do with their own land,” such
as prevent from using it for commercial reasons, or to keep undeveloped land in that state.
The law of servitudes is complex, because negative servitudes or easements are known by
varying terms, including real covenants, and equitable servitudes, “but the modern trend is
to call all negative servitudes covenants.”81 While these terms may appear interchangeable
and are in fact used almost interchangeably today, they do denote different situations and
different powers.
Easements are among the oldest of the nonpossessory rights to property, dating
back to medieval England. In an easement, the land subjected to the burden is called the
burdened or servient estate, while the land that benefits from the easement is the benefited
or dominant estate. In the case of an estate whose benefit runs with the land, the easement
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is known as an appurtenant servitude. If, however, the servitude does not run with the land
but with an individual, it is a servitude in gross.82 For an easement to run with the land, it
must exist in writing, there must be notice to the servient estate holder, and there must be
an intent for it to run with that servient estate.83
When it comes to negative easements, which are restrictions held by one party on
what a property owner can do with their land, the traditional limits to easements by contract
included only the right to lateral support of a building, the right to prevent the blockage of
light and air, and the right to prevent interference with the flow of water.84 However, the
law of covenants expanded these traditional limitations, and relevant to our preservation
purposes, there now exists language that prevents land from being developed for
environmental reasons – a conservation easement; or that prevents the alteration or
demolition of a historic building – a preservation easement. For a preservation easement to
be valid, it must run with the land, and the easement must be held by a certified easementholding organization capable of continuously regulating the easement. Preservation
easements are generally understood to be the single most powerful preservation tool that
exists, because they run with the land forever and are almost impossible to destroy.85
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Real Covenants and Equitable Servitudes
The next category of private restrictions that evolved to address the limitations of
easements were real covenants, which addressed the issue of being able to benefit or burden
future possessors of property. A contract between proprietors would bind all successors if
it was written down, intended to bind future owners, if it touched and concerned the land,
and if there was privity of estate (mutual ownership of the land). Where there was a lack
of privity of estate, the third concept of equitable servitudes evolved – these were
“covenants that could be enforced by injunction despite the lack of privity.”86 While real
covenants required privity, equitable servitudes required notice of restrictions for the new
owner.
In the United States, property law merged these concepts of real covenants and
equitable servitudes through the new idea of instantaneous privity, which meant that privity
existed if a covenant could be formed during the transfer of land. Because of the rise of
private communities during the twentieth century, “courts relaxed restrictions on the
covenant form, merging the law of real covenants and equitable servitudes, and modifying
or even abolishing touch and concern and privity requirements,” a key development that
community builders and developers used greatly in the formation of private communities.87
Almost all developers of private communities today do not know or care about the
subtle distinctions between easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes, or their
historical development, where each successive one was created to address limitations with
the previous one. Simply put, the Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions (CC&Rs) are
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drafted quickly and use a set standard prior to start of a new private community. The units
are then built, and sold off to individuals as buyers agree to the covenants and are bound
by the newly created association. This method reverses the Lockian belief that property is
the root of all rights and exists before the social contract does, because the order is reversed:
first there is a plan, then the rules to preserve the property, then the property is built, and
lastly there are the inhabitants.88 In trying to use private preservation solutions, however,
we are reversing this again so that the already-established community comes first and then
we use privatism to preserve built heritage and the presence of the community members
themselves. It is a narrower and much more specific purpose than that of modern-day
private governments.

Racial Restrictions
Part of the largest and best-recognized historic problem with private communities
was the racial restrictions that almost all of them imposed to keep racial minorities out.
Racial zoning restrictions had existed in various municipalities since the end of the
nineteenth century, to prevent the mixing of people of different racial backgrounds,
supposedly to keep the peace and general welfare, along with ‘racial integrity.’ However,
in a landmark 1917 case, Buchanan v. Warley, the Supreme Court ruled that racial zoning
laws were unconstitutional in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.89 This ruling did not
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prevent developers from finding a private solution to the desire for racial and minority
exclusions; they turned to the restrictive covenants to impose the same restrictions but in a
legally allowed private contractual setting. These prohibited the sale of property to African
Americans, Indians, Jews, Latinos, and Native Americans.
This scheme for limiting private communities to wealthy white people continued
legally for decades until 1948, when the United States Supreme Court ruled in the landmark
Shelley v. Kraemer case that racially restrictive covenants were unconstitutional and in
violation of the Fourteenth Amendment. The case was difficult because the Constitution
could only apply if state action had been found; in this case, Kraemer, a white resident,
sought to enforce the community’s racially restrictive covenants against the petitioners,
Shelley, a black family. The Supreme Court found that bringing the case to trial was in
itself the relevant state action that allowed the Court to rule that the racial covenants’ were
unconstitutional.90 The US Supreme Court also cited the Civil Rights Act of 1866 in its
decision, which states that all citizens have the same rights to “inherit, purchase, lease, sell,
hold, and convey real and personal property.”91
Despite this momentous ruling, private communities found other ways to restrict
access, mainly through more contemporary systems such as background checks and credit
scores, thereby excluding whole swathes of the population on economic grounds.92 The
Federal Housing Administration had supported racially restrictive covenants on the
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grounds of neighborhood stability, and it was not until 1968 that the Fair Housing Act was
passed, legally prohibiting these racial covenants. This problematic history of
socioeconomic and racial inequity reflects very serious policy considerations that merit
debate and reflection. Notwithstanding, the utility of covenants toward the private
preservation of communities, be they historic or not, is still too powerful to completely
disregard. For the purposes of this thesis, the aim of historic preservation is emphasized
despite these consequential policy issues.

Private Governments Upheld
Indeed, restrictive covenants in their broadest sense have been consistently upheld
by the courts, but not if they are arbitrary, unreasonable, if they contradict public policy,
or if they are unconstitutional. This general rule was clarified after a series of cases, most
notable among them the 1994 California Supreme Court ruling on Nahrstedt v. Lakeside
Village Condominium Association. In that case, plaintiff Natore Nahrstedt bought a unit at
Lakeside Village and lived with her three cats, despite the prohibition against keeping pets.
The association sued and ultimately won because the restriction was neither unreasonable
nor unconstitutional, and it did not contradict public policy; it also followed California’s
laws. The court ruled that it would be wrong to release one individual from the obligations
which she agreed to at the detriment of the rest of the unit owners.93 The Nahrstedt ruling
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codified the limits of private government regulations – a basis which allows for most of
the current regulations within private communities to continue standing.
All of these sorts of restrictions reveal what historian Robert M. Fogelson has
identified as the most intrinsic reasons why people choose to buy into a private community
– desires for stability, fears of unwanted change and distrust of others.94 This has in essence
been part of the guiding reasons for the ever-increasing popularity and widespread use of
private communities. However, we cannot forget about the desire to protect property,
values, heritage, and communities themselves. While the history of private communities
and their use of internal restrictions is complex and at times problematic, this does not take
away from the value of private contractual agreements through restrictive covenants to
protect and preserve heritage sites in an extra-governmental way.

Forest Hills Gardens’ Privatization
As we have seen, restrictive covenants have been used by developers and
community builders for various reasons; to protect new developments, to keep certain
people out, to maintain a stable community, to maintain a certain lifestyle, and to preserve
property values. Intertwined in all of these is an important architectural element – many of
these private communities were designed with bespoke architectural and planning
standards and designs, by prominent and leading designers. For example, the Queens, NY
site that helped to inspire this thesis, Forest Hills Gardens, was master-planned by
Grosvenor Atterbury and Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. The general manager, John M.
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Demarest, knew at the start of the garden suburb’s development that “all the buildings had
been designed to harmonize with one another in both material and design, and the
landscape and planting scheme for the entire property was designed by an expert.
Restrictions were in place to guarantee that the ‘homes of today will be protected and in
time become more attractive and more valuable.’”95 Atterbury and Olmsted themselves
were quite concerned with preserving their unique creation for posterity; Olmsted wrote an
advisory report recommending the use of restrictive covenants to control the look of the
houses and landscapes.96 Inspired by the restrictions at the planned community of Roland
Park in Baltimore, the Russell Sage Foundation filed a plat map and a Declaration of
Restrictions for the community in 1911, to remain in effect until 1950. A new type of
restriction was also used – that of requiring approval from a design board for all alterations
and new construction, and relating to aesthetics, structure, materials, and color schemes.
Maintenance fees would be levied on all homeowners in proportion to their property size,
and the Sage Foundation desired that the homeowners manage themselves internally, so as
to be as democratic as possible and preserve stability and harmony.97
By 1921, Atterbury and Olmsted saw declining design standards and breaches of
the restrictive covenants, and hoped that the Sage Foundation would maintain control.
However, by May of 1922, the Foundation had decided to sell all of its remaining stock in
the Sage Foundation Homes Company to a syndicate which later became the Forest Hills
Gardens Corporation in December of that year. In the intervening time, therefore, the
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homeowners had to come together to bind themselves voluntarily to the restrictive
covenants under a new organization, one whose job was “to act as their common agency
‘to promote and to sustain in Forest Hills Gardens in all suitable ways the living and
aesthetic conditions for which the Gardens was founded.’”98 The ownership was finalized
in January 1, 1923, and since then the Forest Hills Gardens Corporation has regulated and
maintained the community in the name of its residents. The community’s survival at heart
“depends on the willingness of each one of its residents to protect, preserve, and maintain
it,” by actively engaging in the internal regulatory and management systems.99
That gap in time, from May 1922 to January 1923, represents a vital transition
period in the community, when residents agreed to self-regulate and impose restrictions
upon the use of their property. In essence that is the idea behind this thesis’ proposal – that
private residents may seek an extra-governmental preservation solution through internal
regulatory mechanisms. Scholars have acknowledged that this is possible, and has indeed
been done, but that the transaction costs – meaning social, economic, political, fundraising,
logistical planning efforts, etc. – are very high. Law professor Dan Tarlock believed that
for non-private communities, the “high transaction costs of private actions to protect
neighborhood quality often posed an insurmountable obstacle to collective private
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efforts.”100 However, while difficult, it is not impossible, and has indeed been seen in a few
cases.

Precedents of Privatization
One of these first instances was at Louisburg Square, Boston, in 1826. There was a
private park around which stately houses stood, and in order to privately preserve the park,
twenty-eight property owners signed a mutual contract in 1844 establishing the Committee
of the Proprietors of Louisburg Square, binding each other and all future owners to
conserve the park.101 This mutual contract was in essence an equitable servitude, so that the
obligation would not only bind the signatories, but all future owners, in essence running
with the land.102 To this day, Louisburg Square is a private park held by the surrounding
property’s owners, in one of the most expensive neighborhoods in Boston. This is a notable
example because it was both the first private government and it was formed after the houses
had been built, a truly rare occurrence.103
A similar precedent that exists for the privatization of property after its construction
exists in St. Louis, where city streets were deeded over by the city to private neighborhood
communities in an effort to stabilize communities and prevent crime through decreased
access.104 Of course, St. Louis has hundreds of private communities, so the social
transaction costs there might be less than in other places. In Houston, famously the largest
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city without a zoning code, there are instead also dozens of private communities.105 A 1985
Texas law let property owners without private communities or deed restrictions or whose
deed restrictions expired, to write new restrictions upon themselves and their property
titles, again collectively binding each other under one private association. It is surely
difficult to overcome the sociopolitical and economic transaction costs necessary to get
widespread community approval for new regulations, but this is routinely done in Houston.
Under this law, a property owner in a community without restrictions can create a petition
to create a private community, which must be approved by 75% of the lot owners.106

Proposal to Privatize Through Legislation
There exist a few scholars who encourage neighbors to come together and form a
private community, among these Robert M. Nelson and Stefano Moroni. In response to
critiques, Moroni emphasized that when private individuals come together to form such an
association, it is not a privatization of public space, but only a reorganization of alreadyprivate property into a collective union for their own benefit.107 Nelson has been the most
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vocal supporter of allowing individual homeowners to come together and privatize a
community through a private government created long after the houses have been built,
calling these creations a “Neighborhood Association in an Established Neighborhood,” or
NASSENs for short.108 He argues that the appeal of a private community, with all its
amenities, is too powerful, and it is unfair for homeowners who do not live in such a
community but want to. His proposal is a five-step process, beginning with assembling
60% of homeowners who agree to ask the state to allow them to form a private community
association, describing the boundaries, the services, and the governance; then the state
would certify the reasonableness of the new community government; the state would allow
a service-transfer agreement to ensue with the municipality; a neighborhood election would
be scheduled; and finally the election would occur to determine if the community were
established. This proposal relies on the initial introduction of new legislation by states
allowing this privatization to occur.109
Nelson acknowledges the advantage of having a more local say in issues of property
maintenance and historic preservation, allowing neighbors to control the look and feel of
their community when one-size-fits-all zoning cannot cover the specifics of unique or
historic communities.110 He also expands this thinking, arguing that inner-city
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neighborhoods may want to privatize to help stem the tide of crime, litter, and to conserve
the peace and introduce amenities. His suggestion is therefore “to bring suburban powers
of exclusion – the rights of private property, if now in a collective form – into the inner
city.”111 It is, however, a harsh reality that the transaction costs and logistics to achieve this
would be very high, and almost prohibitive in an existing neighborhood.112

Proposal to Privatize Through Covenants
Therefore, my proposal, while similar in desire for a privatized union among
homeowners, is smaller in scale. Knowing about real covenants and equitable servitudes,
imagine a scenario where two preservation-mindful neighbors who want to restrict
alterations and prohibit demolition of their property might create a mutual contract
imposing these restrictions upon themselves and their heirs and assigns. These deed
restrictions would be equitable servitudes, because the restrictions could be enforced in
court through an injunction. This agreement between two neighbors would grow as more
preservation-minded property owners wished to enter this private, internal-regulatory
community. It would be very useful if the homeowners had adjacent properties, or if they
could establish that they had once been part of a united development.113
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The Historic House Association of America suggested a similar private
preservation solution in 1981, acknowledging that at times preservation through
government was not available or feasible. They included the techniques of Right of First
Refusal and Option to Purchase as limitations on potential successors that could preserve
a historic property in a private manner. As to the use of mutual covenants, they explained
that it was possible for neighbors to mutually impose limitations upon future use, and for
owners to be able to bring forth litigation to correct a violation.114 Finally, the Association
also suggested using a Sale Subject to Protective Covenants as a tool for a seller of a
historic house to be able to continue regulating the future use the historic property; the
disadvantage is that they would only be enforceable during the seller’s lifetime, and in
many jurisdictions cannot be inherited or assigned.115 Furthermore, it is difficult for
neighbors to self-regulate each other and maintain an aura of friendliness; this explains
why in private communities there is an association that takes on the responsibility of
regulating the covenants and restrictions, in the name of all residents. Even in wellpreserved Forest Hills Gardens, where the Corporation actively regulates the community,
“lack of compliance with and ‘even total contempt’ for the architectural guidelines for new
construction and renovation is a significant problem…”116 Clearly, convincing
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homeowners in a private community to actively preserve the standards and regulations can
be a continuously difficult task.117
Therefore, despite several useful suggestions, we again meet the difficulty of
overcoming high transaction costs in convincing people to ignore their property values for
the sake of preservation. Nonetheless, the mutually restrictive real covenants are the best
way that a group of preservation-minded homeowners can restrict themselves and all future
owners, because they allow mutual enforceability not limited to the first seller, but to all
future owners.

Proposal to Privatize Through Local Easements
The second private preservation solution presented in this thesis is the use of a
historic preservation easement with a local, community-centered, easement-holding nonprofit. This has a strong precedent throughout the country, where state or local communities
have stepped up to privately preserve individual historic properties by accepting
preservation easements.118 Typically, a historic preservation easement can be donated to an
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easement-holding organization (such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation, or the
New York Landmarks Conservancy), and the property owner can get a significant tax
deduction for their loss of market value, which they experience because of this powerful
restriction. However, in that case, to receive a tax deduction, the property must individually
be listed on the National Register of Historic Places, which is a significant threshold to
cross.119 Easements are incredibly powerful private preservation tools because they run
with the land and are held in perpetuity by the dominant estate, in these cases the easementholding organization.
Under this thesis’ second proposal for a private preservation solution, a
preservation-minded property owner would donate a preservation easement to a strictly
local non-profit preservation organization, which would regulate the exterior of the
property although the property itself might change hands of ownership through the years.
Depending on how onerous the easement donation was created, there might be some
alterations allowed, but the local community organization would nonetheless regulate such
alterations and prevent outright demolitions. This community organization could be
replicated in any community, and would be managed by trustees, composed of community
members themselves, thus ensuring a local and democratic preservation and conservation
solution. The donation of easements and their protection in perpetuity occurs all throughout
the nation but on a much larger scale; the National Trust holds scores of easements all
across the country, and the New York Landmarks Conservancy holds easements all across
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New York City.120 For this solution, an entirely localized, qualified, easement-holding nonprofit would privately protect homeowners’ properties in perpetuity. It would be necessary
for each property to be listed on the National Register of Historic Places in order to receive
a tax deduction. Furthermore, it would be imperative to work closely with the Secretary of
the Interior and the IRS to give residents their tax deductions, although that in and of itself
is a significant challenge as well, in particular with recent governmental threats to the
system.121
An example of a localized private preservation solution through easements similar
to this suggestion did occur in the town of Ipswich, Massachusetts. In the 1970s residents
launched an effort to collect and accumulate easement donations from historic seventeenthcentury houses; sixteen property owners donated easements to the local historical
commission and Heritage Trust, which they themselves had founded.122 Some of the
original donors did not even accept a monetary compensation for their easement donation,
a veritable rarity in a culture that prizes property values. None could receive a tax deduction
because the properties were not listed on the National Register. Even with such a successful
example, it is clear that not only is strong community support imperative for the success of
the private preservation solution, but moreover the easement holder must be effective in

120

“Preservation Easements,” The National Trust for Historic Preservation: Preservation
Leadership Forum, accessed April 10, 2019,
https://forum.savingplaces.org/learn/fundamentals/preservation-law/easements.
121
The IRS has recently scrutinized façade easement donations to such an extent that easement
donations nationwide have diminished, and some owners have chosen not to receive the tax
benefits because of the audit risk. Phelps, “Preserving Perpetuity?,” 957-958.
Matthew J. Norton, Mary Burke Baker, and Kevin C. Klein, “IRS Shines a Spotlight on
Syndicated Conservation Easements,” The National Law Review, September 14, 2018,
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/irs-shines-spotlight-syndicated-conservation-easements.
122
“Something to Preserve,” Historic Ipswich, accessed April 30, 2019,
https://historicipswich.org/2017/08/18/something-to-preserve/.

47

permanently monitoring and upholding the strict terms of the contractual agreement.123 In
the case of a local non-profit whose mission it would be to hold neighborhood easements
in perpetuity, it would not be necessary that the properties were listed on the National
Register unless the owners wanted the tax deduction. However, the donation of an
easement without a financial incentive is a high transaction cost to consider indeed.

Conclusion
Despite these difficulties, these two private preservation solutions have the
potential of achieving preservation goals for residents and communities that desire them.
Using concepts of property law, from easements to equitable servitudes, it is possible for
private property owners to mutually and voluntarily restrict current and future use as an
extra-governmental preservation solution. While the history of private communities is long
and complex with its problematic histories of elitism and racial exclusion, these proposals
can help bring preservation to all communities, despite their not having been preemptively
preserved through a private government at the time of their construction. In the following
section, we will see how the land trust and the land-lease system, another innovative,
Howard-inspired private solution, can be used to create true common ownership of land in
the private sphere, helping people preserve their heritage and their communities as well.
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Section 4 – Land Trusts and Private Solutions
Introduction
After looking at the role of private governments and the way that individuals
preserve communities through individual ownership of property, this section will look at
the communal ownership and control of property that is more faithful to Howard and
George’s land-tax system. Land trusts are the legal and private means by which people can
hold title to land in common, for various reasons, including for affordable housing (which
Community Land Trusts do quite well) to limited-equity cooperative housing and land
conservancy trusts to conserve undeveloped land.124 There are also for-profit land trust
models where single-ownership pays out dividends to shareholders, seen in Real Estate
Investment Trusts (REITs) and Multiple-Tenant Income Properties (MTIPs) – systems
with the potential of preserving heritage and communities by paying back dividends to
community shareholders. Starting with a recapitulation of the central points of Howard and
George’s visions for communal land ownership and land-rent, we will then look at the
various iterations of land trust systems and how they can function as private preservation
tools.

Howard and George’s Visions
As we have seen, community builders in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries
have not been successful in truly bringing to life Howard’s vision for communal land
ownership, despite efforts in several places. They have instead moved away from that
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vision and towards a privatized one where land is privately owned by a group of people
who share certain communal spaces and amenities. In contrast, as Howard explained in his
visionary work, the Garden City would only have one landlord, the people themselves. The
land would be held in trust, and all residents would collectively own the land but
individually rent out their living, working, and agricultural spaces. Originally because of
the need to pay back the interest on the construction and land-purchase loans, residents of
the Garden City would pay a landlord’s rent as “interest on debentures.” Howard called
this rent that residents would pay the rate-rent; it would diminish as more people moved
into the Garden City, and in addition establish an endowment for the future running of the
city, until the landlord’s rent were entirely abolished, “the community depending solely on
the very large powers it possesses as a landlord.”125
In order to manage the Garden City after the interest on the debenture (loan) were
paid off and the rate-rent were used for supporting all municipal services, residents would
democratically elect a board of managers, who in effect acted as trustees. This Board of
Management would possess ample powers because it would act on behalf of all the people
and exercise “those wider rights, powers and privileges which are enjoyed by landlords
under the common law.”126 As a private, quasi-public entity, the trust would control the
plan of the city, all monetary concerns, and oversight and control of the various
departments that Howard envisioned.127
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Howard called his governance system the “local option” and “Social
Individualism,” combining capitalist with socialist elements into a cohesive assembly that
served the people who lived in the Garden City.128 McKenzie has named this system of
governance a “democratically controlled corporate technocracy,” led by the Board of
Managers in tandem with associations of individuals united for causes that helped the
greater good, while still making a profit for individuals and the community’s fund.129 This
profit was a limited four percent dividend that was redistributed to the Garden City; this
limitation ensured that it did not become a speculative and intensely for-profit endeavor,
but that it remained affordable for the residents paying their rate-rents.130 This limited
return is a crucial element in the successful functioning of land trusts in their fight against
speculation and displacement. By purchasing the land in a land trust, Howard truly
envisioned communal ownership of the land, going up against centuries of private property
systems wherein landlords alone received profits from rising land values.
Such a conception of a land trust was influenced by Henry George’s ideas, mainly
that of the single-tax on property. George was bothered by the fact that landlords could
speculatively raise rents as they saw fit for their own profit, and suggested taxing property
as a solution, so that it would be put to its best use. Instead of taxing people for the
improvements they made upon the land, the government would tax landowners who did
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not have improvements, and those with improvements would be exempt from as high taxes.
George wanted to treat land as “the common property of the whole people,” but could not
so radically alter the system; therefore, his single-tax, ground-rent scheme was a practical
way to achieve that, by rewarding the improvers of land and simultaneously establishing a
growing common fund from which all would benefit. As he saw it under his system, “no
one could afford to hold land he was not using, and land not in use would be thrown open
to those who wished to use it…”131
Howard used some of George’s ideas in his own Garden City vision, but instead of
solely relying on a tax, he proposed communal land ownership in addition to the single
rate-rent tax on property. There are several tax enclaves that used site value taxation to shift
the tax burden to the land, not on buildings.132 A few Garden City-inspired communities
that used the land-lease system were developed in the early twentieth century, including
Arden, Delaware, which continues using this system to this day.133 Founded by sculptor
and businessman Frank Stephens in 1900 as an artists’ community, all land in Arden is still
held in trust by three trustees who grant 99-year leases to residents and set the annual land
rent or single tax owed per house.134 Residents only pay the land rent, and the community
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pays the County of New Castle annual property taxes on behalf of the entire community,
which is one large parcel of land, managed by the Arden Land Trust.135

Land Trusts and CLTs
The moniker “land trust” itself was first used by one of George’s followers, Ralph
Borsodi, who believed that land should always be communally held, never by private
individuals. In addition, another follower, Arthur E. Morgan, helped spread the ideal of
community land trusts throughout rural America during the New Deal era.136 These early
land trusts were located in planned developments, and the land was owned by a nonprofit
corporation, whose governance was composed of only the development’s homeowners.
As such, they served various purposes for the benefit of the community, such as
building family farms and supporting economic development. However, as John Emmeus
Davis explains, these early land trusts were not community land trusts (CLTs), whose
operational characteristics, management and particular mission set it apart. In essence,
CLTs operate on the belief that land and housing should not be commodities and that land
speculation that displaces residents should be prevented. In a CLT, the landowner is a
private and democratically-structured nonprofit corporation “with a corporate membership
that is open to anyone living within the CLT’s geographically defined ‘community;’” it has
a majority board elected by the membership; and there is a “balance of interests” on the
board, where tenants, donors, and public officials sit.137 Being a land trust, a CLT is a type
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of land and property reform that treats the symptoms of land and property speculation,
which prevents people from being priced out.138
The CLT gives residents long-term leases to live on property but never own the
land; in turn residents pay a lease fee that is based on the use value, not the full market
value.139 Under a land trust, local control can potentially be gained and maintained, but not
in all cases, because residents might feel and actually be excluded from the management
of the CLT.140 CLTs do occasionally encourage the residents to perform development
functions as individuals or through associations, including through community
development corporations. However, residents do not directly influence the board because
they are essentially the benefactors, not the trustees, and only some residents sit on the
board. Coupled with the politicization of CLTs and the representation of public officials
on the boards, this embodies some of the problems that CLTs encounter in being unable to
give benefactors direct control and profit.141 This will be explored further on in the section.
There have been additional historical problems with convincing people to trust in the
leasehold principle and abandon the dream of private property ownership for the greater
good; this is one of the most difficult burdens to overcome.142 However, CLTs generally
benefit communities by preventing speculation, giving communities access to land and
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property that common systems might exclude them from. They provide security, earned
equity, stable housing for communities, and preserve community equity and legacy.143

International Examples of Common Land-Ownership
Other international examples of common land tenure or investments for the
common good exist throughout the world. In Tanzania, after the land nationalization of
1968 that returned the nation to the traditional Ujamaa Vijijini (“familyhood in villages”)
system, land now belongs to all the people and is only held when in use. The Mexican ejido
(“village lands”) system replaced landlords and allowed communities to control and
preserve their villages and lands. In India, there is the Gramdan (“village gift”) movement,
villages act as trustees of land on behalf of the community for the benefit of individuals to
use. The Jewish National Fund similarly functions through trustees who lease land to
kibbutz or moshav shitufi, popular collective ownership agricultural communities. It owns
approximately 60% of land in Israel and has prevented speculation and displacement.144
There are other international examples, including in Germany, Holland, and some East
Asian nations, where collective land management and George-like taxation systems have
been used under the broad term “land readjustment” or “land pooling” in Australia. Despite
their great promise, land readjustment applications need broad landowner support; the
system has been met with suspicion throughout the world for being too radical, and can
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break down “when confronted with the thorny realities of the conservatism of entrenched
political and economic interests,” which prove to be difficult realities time and again.145

Conservancy Trusts and CLTs for Affordability
As non-profit organizations that hold ownership to land in trust for the benefit of
another party, land trusts have been widely used in the form of (CLTs) to preserve
affordability and communities themselves. A community land trust buys and holds the title
to usually cheap property, and constructs buildings often with subsidies to sell the
residences to low-income residents. These residents buy the unit but hold a ground lease
for the land.146 In some cases, however, a land trust can be created for the sole purpose of
conserving open land, protecting water, space for parks and preserves, scenic views, and
preventing development through an easement or restrictive covenant, as in the cases of
conservancy or land conservation trusts.147 Conservation easements donated by landowners
are placed on this undeveloped land, and held in trust and regulated by a land trust. In
general, conservation trusts are more present in wealthier communities, whereas CLTs are
more prevalent in urban, low-income areas.148 Along the same lines, according go land trust
pioneer Robert Swann, conservancy trusts are more self-centered and interested with
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keeping people off the land, whereas CLTs aim to make land and property affordable.149
With the threat of environmental loss through climate change, overdevelopment, and loss
of cultural landscapes, land trusts have become very popular in recent years, and now
number approximately 1,200 throughout the United States, according to the Land Trust
Alliance.150
Community land trusts are popular for helping low-income workers find affordable
housing, and have been widely used since the Civil Rights Era and the recent and continued
trend of rising housing costs.151 They are very favored by among grassroots organizers and
advocates of preserving affordable housing, especially in distressed or rent-burdened
communities, and as potential catalysts for revitalizing neighborhoods and preserving
communities.152 Some have also been inspired by George’s unearned land value, seeking
to apply it to gentrifying areas and labeling it a “gentrification increment” whose increased
tax revenue has the potential to fund the development of affordable housing and
preservation of communities.153 Despite these important advantages, CLTs do have some
problems, especially when it comes to not being able to let people profit from the private
and communal ownership of land.
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Deed Restriction vs Ground-Lease
The ground-lease restriction enforced by CLTs can be more powerful than regular,
private deed restrictions, which have also been used to preserve affordability. Both deed
restrictions for affordable homeownership and CLT ground-lease restrictions use price
restrictions, buyer eligibility restrictions to ensure that tenants are income-qualified,
occupancy and use restrictions, and mortgage financing restrictions to prevent
foreclosure.154 While deed restrictions placed on individual properties can be strong and
allow the buyer total land ownership, they can only be enforced for up to 30 years since
there is no privity of estate with another entity and because governments generally prohibit
perpetuities without privity or restraints on alienation.155 Because the effective
enforceability of individual deed restrictions is weak, some programs have been established
to monitor and enforce such restrictions that are aimed at preserving affordable housing.
Nonetheless, the CLT remains a more powerful alternative to ostensibly perpetually
preserving affordability, because there is legal privity through the single ownership of land,
meaning that restrictions are much more easily enforced. The constant monitoring and
enforcement by the CLT of its lessees means that affordability is conserved, as is the entire
system.156 In an interesting case, the Chicago CLT, founded by the city government in 2006,
is not technically a CLT at all since it does not own the land outright, but is managed as a
CLT. The idea that a CLT can manage land that it does not outright own helps support the
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concept of a nonprofit land/property management trust, of which we will see a real-world
example in section 5. The Chicago CLT ensures affordable housing not through ground
leases but through deed restrictions which are managed by the its board in trust for the
benefit of its residents.157
CLTs do important work in preserving housing affordability, but its sources of
funding mean that there is a separation between the trustees and the benefactors of the
trust’s services. For the most part, CLTs need a great amount of fundraising to acquire land,
develop housing, and operate the organization, among other expenses. For the earliest
CLTs, a “miracle financing” donor usually gave a crucial amount, and the CLT might
acquire small loans from philanthropists or institutions. For example, in 1989 Boston’s
Dudley Neighbors, Inc., a CLT with municipal-granted eminent-domain powers, was able
to buy privately owned vacant land through a $2 million Ford Foundation loan.158 After
1992, CLTs were able to receive federal funding and technical assistance through official
Community Housing Development Organization (CHDO) designation, as well as loans
from the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) and mortgage
financing from Fannie Mae and later private lenders.159 Municipalities have also partly
funded (or in the case of Chicago, entirely founded) CLTs usually for the express purpose
of preserving affordable housing, which is commendable, but narrows the scope of action
for land trusts in the popular understanding.160 While CLTs do an important job of
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preserving affordability and therefore communities, they are nonprofits managed by a
board of trustees who are not beholden to the trust’s benefactors. For this reason, there are
alternate, profitable, and potentially better ways of using the land trust, land-lease methods
to preserve communities and heritage, discussed below.

History and Workings of REITs
CLTs in the United States and around the world are significant because of their role
in preserving communities and housing affordability through the mechanisms discussed.
However, a CLT is a nonprofit corporation, while a real estate investment trust (REIT) is
for-profit private entity. In addition, an investment trust is a closed system – “a private
entity with private purposes… while the CLT is open...” As a nonprofit, members or
beneficiaries of a CLT cannot own or hold the corporation’s assets, whereas in a legal real
estate trust, members own an equity share of the assets.161 In both cases the organizations
are said to be democratically structured because there is representation by board members,
but ownership of shares does not exist for a CLT.
The history of REITs is older than that of CLTs, and they were born directly from
land trusts. The earliest land trust model began in Boston in the middle of the nineteenth
century, when real estate trusts were created so that investors could commonly own
property. The Massachusetts Trust was formed because corporations were not allowed to
own property, so corporations and individuals in association were unable to invest and deal
in real estate only. This new legal entity had corporation-like benefits, namely
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“transferability of ownership shares, limited liability, and centralized management
expertise.”162 In addition, the Massachusetts Trust benefited from not having to pay federal
taxes, so investors could each receive dividends collected from the properties’ rents. The
Trust was open to wealthy and general investors, and became a popular model followed in
other cities, until a 1935 Supreme Court decision took away its favorable tax status. Land
trusts could not compete with tax-favored mutual funds and real estate syndicates such as
buildings and loans associations.163 Only in 1960, after lobbying from the real estate
industry and with the subsequent amendment to the tax law did real estate trusts acquire
similar benefits to mutual funds.164
Under this 1960 law, Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) were able to be formed
formally as “an unincorporated association with multiple trustees as managers and having
transferable shares of beneficial interest,” following in the pattern of closed-end investment
companies that issued shares whose value would fluctuate.165 The tax law placed important
restrictions on REITs, such as having to pay annually to its shareholders a minimum 90%
of its taxable income, and having at least 100 shareholders with no more than 5
shareholders owning 50% of the shares, among others.166 Because of these restrictions,
REITs can be held as long-term passive investments, with a property manager at the helm.
REITs have suffered several ups and downs since the 1970s, due to changing
federal tax laws and larger economic conditions, along with the expansion and growth of

162

Su Han Chan, John Erickson, and Ko Wang, Real Estate Investment Trusts: Structure,
Performance, and Investment Opportunities (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), 14-15.
163
Ibid., 15.
164
This was the REIT Act title contained in the Cigar Excise Tax Extension of 1960, signed into
law by President Eisenhower.
165
Chan, et al, Real Estate Investment Trusts, 15.
166
Ibid., 16.

61

the REIT market in general.167 After a boom in the 1990s, REITs have truly exploded, and
since then are a regular favorite of Wall Street institutional investors and individuals,
comprising $3 trillion worth of assets in the United States.168 REITs have increasingly been
concerned with having social impacts, and there are some that invest in affordable housing
and others in historic buildings as part of their broader growth and impact strategies.169
Despite immense growth and commendable social impact projects, for-profit real-estate
ownership is still not accessible to the vast majority of people as there are large minimum
amounts for accredited investors (those who have a net worth of at least $1 million) to be
able to invest in private REITs. Furthermore, for those who can access such for-profit
ownership, it often is through a retirement or brokerage account, meaning the investment
is passive and the investor is relatively unconcerned with the direct impact the REIT is
having on actual property.
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Proposal of Local REITs for Preservation
Therefore, one of the proposals outlined here is to allow small-scale individual
investors to be able to buy shares in property within a community, much as REITs do now,
but on a smaller, community-wide scale. Using REITs as inspiration, it is possible to
envision local individuals owning shares from a historic community property and reaping
a profitable dividend from its use via its rental income. If REITs are seen as stable and
lucrative investments because of the basic element of a continuous rental income, then the
foundational idea should easily be transferred over to community use.170 There are some
important drawbacks to this system of small-scale investment in real estate, which parallel
all investments in real estate. The market is less liquid than other markets like stocks and
bonds, meaning assets are less easily bought and sold. There is risk in real estate, and after
the 2008 crash, some investors may be warier of investing in the market. Moreover, real
estate requires continual site management and maintenance, which can be off-putting to
some investors, and dividend yields are not as high as with other markets.171 However,
these drawbacks can be abated for small-scale individual investors if they diversify their
investments, if there is an excellent management scheme and team, and if investors are
united in their goals.
Another model to follow is that of limited equity, low-yield cooperatives, where all
members are simultaneously shareholders of the co-op’s value and land, although as such
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they do not own real property but personal property instead.172 In a regular co-op, the
increase in unit value can be positive for owners who sell their properties at a profit, it can
also threaten the affordability of the units to lower-income families. Therefore, some coops have opted to limit the value or inflation potential of each share, thereby limiting the
equity and keeping a low yield or profit.173 Of course, in a co-op, the shareholder owns and
most usually lives in the unit. Under this thesis’ proposal, the trustees or owners of the unit
would be the same benefactors under the condition that they not live in the same unit but
instead that they collect a dividend from the rental income. If not, the shareholders would
live in a regular cooperative or private government, which defeats the purpose of increased
equity, ownership and control of property with a profit yield.

MTIPs and Land Lease for Profit
A more radical land tenure and property ownership concept is the use MultipleTenant Income Properties (MTIPs), as proposed by scholar Spencer Heath MacCallum. In
suggesting an alternative to the system of individual and private land ownership in private
communities, McCallum looks to commercial real estate for the inspiration to his
nonpolitical solution of land-leasing.174 Similarly to a land trust, under the land-lease
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system, properties are individually held, but the land where they stand are owned and
administered by an organization “as a long-term investment property for income,” in a way
joining the land trust and REIT systems with the ambitious and radical concept of
communal land ownership. Similarly inspired by Howard’s utopian vision of communal
ownership and stewardship of land, MacCallum compares Howard’s land-lease concept to
that of a modern-day hotel or a shopping mall, where a single landlord leases out properties
to multiple tenants.175
MacCallum’s alternative to CIDs and private communities subscribes to the notion
that property can be held in common for the profit of all shareholders, without subdividing
the land at all, in the form of an MTIP, or an estate. Among hotels, there also exist other
examples of MTIPs that surround our everyday lives, such as marinas, mobile-home parks,
apartment complexes, medical centers, research parks, office parks, and ostensibly even
trains, ships, and planes.176 The advantages of single-ownership land-lease over the
subdivided private governments that dot the landscape are numerous: leaseholders- asshareholders are informed decision-makers; their interests are aligned because their
ownership takes the form of undivided shares; there is flexibility in land usage; the
community is financially self-sustaining through the ground rents, not taxation; there can
be effective planning of and by the community; there is predictability in future
management; there is a long-term view taken because of continual tenancy and stake in the
property; a service-oriented personnel that helps manage the community; there is effective
dispute management and teamwork, and less costly litigation because of the profit-
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motivated workings of the entire community. Lastly and importantly, MacCallum argues
that the MTIP eliminates the speculative aspect of many private and non-private
communities, because of the fact that there is a community entrepreneur whose role is to
manage the running of the land and build its value without speculation.177
Like other scholars, MacCallum admits that it is difficult to convince American
consumers not to want to own their own plot of land, because of the long history of cultural
bias in favor of private home and land ownership. Allowing land to be held in common is
for many a very radical departure from accepted norms, although in reality we see these
systems working very well in commercial and residential areas. In critiquing the market
monopolization of private communities and their “compulsory collectivism,” MacCallum
proposes that the MTIP system be more widely accepted, because the land-lease
communities are the “authentic privatization of government.”178 These land-lease for-profit
communities therefore represent one of the ideal solutions for voluntary and communal
property ownership through shareholding that actually pays dividends back to its tenants.

Bacatá Example
Although most often used in commercial real estate and a few RV campgrounds in
the United States, there is potential and hope for shared property ownership to be applied
to residential developments. There are international examples of jointly-owned commercial
real estate ventures. In one famous example in Bogotá, Colombia, thousands of small- and
medium-sized investors came together to buy shares in the construction of Colombia’s
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tallest skyscraper, the 66-story, 1.2 million square-foot Bacatá Tower [Image 6]. It is
ostensibly the world’s first crowdfunded skyscraper; at a cost of $240 million, more than
5,000 people have raised the necessary capital, and each owns a proportional share of the
development and of its profits.179 Colombian investors gave their investments to a
government-backed trust, which controlled the funds and handed them over to the
developer, BD Promotores, as building permits were granted by the municipality.
Crowdfunding in general is quite popular in Colombia as a way for working- and middleclass people to invest a bit and get shares and dividends in return. For the Bacatá Tower,
investors are already getting back dividends which come from the rental income that the
building’s hotel, commercial areas, and apartments generate. The Tower represents the
world’s largest crowdfunding campaign, but there is ostensibly no difference between this
crowdfunding and the joint-venture, common-ownership financial schemes that wealthy
investors use for any equity purchases, especially when compared to the aforementioned
REITs.180
What is necessary for such large-scale investments by thousands of investors to
work is the enabling legislation; in Colombia’s case, the government legalized financial
syndicates and had “created fiduciary authorities to minimize fraud and associated risk,”
thereby giving access to thousands of small-scale investors to collectively pool their
resources. In the United States, minimum investment limits exist which effectively bar
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most of the population from many financial schemes, as does the need for accreditation of
investors.181 While savings and loans associations once performed similarly democratic
investment opportunities for small-scale investors, the savings and loan crisis (1986 to
1995) has almost completely destroyed the industry.182 On the other hand, many credit
unions do still operate as member-owned financial cooperatives that invest in an
individual’s real estate projects through mortgage lending and pay dividends to the
shareholders. The problem here is that the building or land is not held in common and there
are no dividends from such common ownership, so it does not follow in Howard’s vision.

Philadelphia Example
Closer to home, a few communities have partnered with developers to provide lowincome residents an opportunity to control and benefit from development. In Philadelphia,
Mosaic Development Partners used the government’s New Markets Tax Credit, a
crowdfunding service called Small Change, and capital from an Opportunity Zone tax
incentive to raise the $7.2 million for the development.183 Mosaic Partners is developing
Golaski Labs in Northeast Philadelphia, with 39 affordable apartments, mixed-use space,
a co-working space, and a business incubator. The company wanted to attract small-scale
investors (who can invest a minimum $500) in addition to the usual accredited investors
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(who have a net worth of at least $1 million), and achieved this through Small Change, a
crowdfunding firm. Although attracting low-income investors has been difficult because
of their unease and lack of knowledge about the workings of investment finance, Mosaic
is committed to attracting community members who will own shares in the development.184
The element of trust in the system is important to highlight, as working-class community
members will not feel safe investing in a development within their own community if they
do not understand or trust the system. Some developers are also wary of relying on
crowdfunding to finance construction projects, instead seeing it as an alternative to equity;
furthermore, crowdfunding takes time, and developers typically want their sources of
finance secure before construction begins.185 Preservationists are already looking at
crowdfunding and real estate investment as ideas to save and preserve historic buildings
that then turn a profit for social impact investors, thanks to recent changes in securities law
that allow for such local, small-scale investments.186 For communities where development
is taking place, the potential rewards are too powerful to overlook, with community
members gaining a seat at the table and a reliable dividend from their investment while
being able to preserve built heritage.
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Conclusion
Land trusts, CLTs, REITs, MTIPs, cooperatives, and their real-life historical and
present-day applications are important tools that can help protect communities from
speculation and displacement and in some cases provide a return on investment through
the communal ownership, self-governance, and stewardship of property.187 In a sense, the
aim of land trusts and cooperatives is the preservation of community through private legal
limitations, a characteristics shared with private governments, although there are
significant differences as well.188 Their increased use over the last century can be attributed
to the increasing economic anxieties felt by many communities, the inability for many to
have a secure land tenure, along with the loss of land, and the perception that public policy
and regulatory planning has failed people, especially in finding and keeping affordable
housing.189 These efforts to control land, speculation, and displacement through singlelandlord, common ownership and land-lease or ground-rent systems represents yet another
significant privatization of systems that were traditionally controlled by government.190 In
part because of decreasing public funds the private and nonprofit sectors have stepped up
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to fight for communities, for affordable housing, and for land conservation. Scholars have
proposed reducing homeowners’ financial commitments to enter into a stable land tenure
through the use of market-oriented, shared-equity models and/or CLTs.191 It is time, as
social justice advocate Chuck Matthei wrote, “to move from a policy of subsidy to one of
equity,” by giving people the tools to become partners, stakeholders and shareholders in
their communities’ assets and futures.192 Through a reappropriation of Howard and
George’s visions and ideas, and by looking at these various tools and their shared heritage
of communal land ownership and stewardship, we can envision new ways that people
might have a stake in land and property that similarly protects the built heritage and gives
back to the community at the same time. In the following section, we will look at the
viability of applying these proposals for preservation outcomes through the two real-life
case studies in Queens, NY. Although such preservation-oriented applications have been
very few and far between, private preservation through restrictive covenants and communal
land trusts has the potential to work to serve communities and their preservation goals.

191

Kelly, “Land Trusts that Conserve Communities,” 80.
Chuck Matthei, “U.S. Land Reform Movements: The Theory Behind the Practice,” in The
Community Land Trust Reader, 389.
192

71

Section 5 – Three Communities and Private Preservation in Practice
Introduction
The sources of inspiration for this thesis have been one historic, pristinely preserved
community, Forest Hills Gardens, and two case study sites, Richmond Hill and Kew
Gardens [Image 7 shows Richmond Hill and the golf course which became Kew Gardens
to the north]. Richmond Hill was a Victorian railroad suburb envisioned by Albon Platt
Man and begun in 1869; Kew Gardens was a garden suburb developed by Albon Man’s
sons, Alrick H. Man, Arthur Man, and Albon P. Man in 1910 with the opening of the Long
Island Railroad’s East River tunnels; and finally the renowned garden city-inspired garden
suburb of Forest Hills Gardens, envisioned and developed by the Russell Sage Foundation
and designed by Grosvenor Atterbury and Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr., was also begun in
1910. All three are located in central Queens, in New York City, and thus are subject to
local municipal zoning and land-use regulations.
The communities’ histories of growth and change are significant, as are the stories
of community activists and preservation desires and goals achieved. Richmond Hill
illustrates the story of a tight-knit community that desires landmark designation but has
been denied it because of the failures of the public, highly political citywide designation
process. The potential for use of private deed restrictions and easements is great in
Richmond Hill, which has recently been designated a National Register historic district.
Kew Gardens illustrates the story of a factionalized community and the failures of
community planning; however, the potential for application of communal land ownership
(or in this case management of property) is greater in Kew Gardens, as we shall see. Recent
troubles with public preservation and public agencies like the Landmarks Preservation
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Commission (LPC) and the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA) has inspired a
search for private preservation solutions among community residents. Despite the social,
economic, and political difficulties of various kinds associated with radical land tenure
ideas and community organizing, small forays have shown that in some cases residents are
willing to overcome the high transaction costs for the good of preserving communities and
their heritage. As such, the case studies are valuable for demonstrating the potential
application of private preservation tools in theory and practice.

Richmond Hill – History
Albon Man was a wealthy lawyer in nineteenth-century New York City, who
purchased 250 acres of undeveloped farmland in Queens in 1869; it was a time of outward
expansion, with people wanting to leave the crowded Manhattan streets for more spacious
areas with plenty of light and air.193 Together with architect Edward Richmond, both were
influenced by the nineteenth-century planned garden communities being developed outside
major cities, such as Llewellyn Park in New Jersey (1852), Garden City on Long Island
(1869), and Riverside, Illinois (1869).194 The center of this new village was located at the
intersection of Myrtle and Jamaica Avenue with Lefferts Boulevard, where shops, the
Republican Club, the Carnegie Library, a theater, and the railroad station were located, all
within close walking distance of both large Queen Anne style Victorian houses and smaller
homes for the working-classes. Richmond Hill was located adjacent to Forest Park, a 536-
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acre nature preserve that was kept as wooded parkland in part through a land donation from
the Man family.195 This area above Jamaica Avenue and below Forest Park and Division
Street (now 84th Avenue) was the Victorian village of Richmond Hill which is still fairly
racially and socioeconomically homogenous – the modern-day neighborhood is much
larger, and encompasses a large area south of Jamaica which does not necessarily share
this Victorian planned community heritage but is very racially diverse.196
From the beginning, Man knew that he had to plan out Richmond Hill so as to
conserve as much open land as possible; to that end and as part of the legacy of nineteenthand twentieth-century community builders, Man made use of restrictive covenants to
enforce the function and look of all lots. In particular, the covenants enforced a uniform
setback of twenty feet to allow for continuous green lawns, a prohibition against fences,
minimum lot sizes, and restrictions against nuisances of various kinds.197 These covenants
stayed in place for decades, but without a regulatory organization to maintain oversight,
they have been essentially forgotten among the community members. A significant part of
the open land was the village commons near the railroad station at the center, at the
intersection of Lefferts Boulevard and Hillside Avenue, where a Carnegie Library was built
in 1904 [Image 7 shows the railroad line and the common area named ‘park’]. Nearby
stands the Church of the Resurrection, a Tudor-Revival Episcopalian church where Jacob
Riis attended services and where Theodore Roosevelt attended Riis’ daughter’s wedding
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in 1900.198 Notable visitors to the Republican Club – a key neighborhood social institution
– nearby on Lefferts Avenue included Theodore Roosevelt, Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford,
and Ronald Reagan.199
This local history is celebrated to this day in the neighborhood. In the early years
and up to the period after the Second World War, Richmond Hill remained a quiet, mostly
middle-class, white community with professionals who commuted to Manhattan via the
subway or the railroad. The Victorian triangle section, which has the oldest and bestpreserved houses, is also mostly white and middle class today. However, after the 1980s,
the broader neighborhood paralleled Queens’ demographic composition, which greatly
began to change as newcomers from Latin America, Eastern Europe, South Asia, and the
Caribbean arrived. Currently, Richmond Hill at large is very diverse, which is a social gain,
but makes a united sense of community difficult to maintain. There is also poverty,
especially in South Richmond Hill, concentrated among the recent immigrants, which
makes engagement in community history and preservation goals difficult, because of
different priorities that residents have.200 However, the smaller triangular section of the
earliest and largest Victorian houses in northern Richmond Hill has maintained the older,
white families that belong to the middle- and upper-middle classes and remain united
through their church groups, through the Richmond Hill Historical Society and other
community groups, and united through their preservation goals.
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Richmond Hill Historical Society Activism
The Richmond Hill Historical Society, of which I am a current board member, was
founded in the 1997 in part by neighborhood activists Nancy Cataldi and Carl Ballenas,
with the goal of preserving the neighborhood’s history and built heritage.201 The Historical
Society has applied for a historic district designation under the city’s Landmarks
Preservation Commission four times in the last 22 years. To be fair, the first applications
were less formal and not expertly-researched or created, since it was the work of
neighborhood volunteers. However, each successive application has improved upon the
last; despite these improvements, the LPC has been unwilling to grant the community
historic designation, even though most homeowners desire it. In an ironic twist of fate,
Cataldi’s own Victorian home, which she had carefully restored, was severely altered by
new owners after her death in 2008, further highlighting the lack of protections for historic
properties through the public sector.202 This is particularly hurtful for community advocates
of preservation whose volunteer efforts to gain historic district status and protect the built
heritage have as of yet not worked out in the public arena through the LPC.
Because the four local nominations to the LPC have not been successful in the past,
the fifth and most recent push for designation came at the National Register level. This
effort to be listed as a National Register (not local) district began in 2016 with the support
and funding from City Councilmember Eric Ulrich’s office and the support of the Historic
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District’s Council under their Six to Celebrate program.203 Through this support and
funding, the Historical Society worked with preservation consultant Chris Brazee, who
researched and documented hundreds of properties and came up with a thoroughly
comprehensive nomination to submit to the New York State Historic Preservation Office
(SHPO). Earlier this year, after reviewing the nomination for many months, the SHPO
recommended nomination to the National Register of almost 200 of the most wellpreserved Victorian homes.204 The district was officially listed in the National Register of
Historic Places on March 7, 2019, to the delight of many in the community, especially
activists in the Historical Society. Despite this happy occasion, National Register
designation does not confer any legal protections against alterations or demolitions of
historic properties, and so the community would still like to become a local, New York
City historic district.
In private meetings, it has seemed unlikely that we will gain the LPC’s support any
time soon. In one preservation event in 2016, I asked the then-Director of Preservation and
current Chair of the LPC, Sarah Carroll, if she believed that Richmond Hill would ever be
listed on the local register. She replied that it would be difficult, because almost all the
houses in the neighborhood are old and wood-frame construction, whereas the Commission
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prefers nominating houses built with masonry construction.205 In the most recent meeting
with the LPC and the HDC to see the viability of filing a new nomination application and
using the same very thorough report that Chris Brazee had compiled for the SHPO, the
LPC staff presented what seemed to be a new obstacle, asking for additional images of the
historic properties showing them as streetscapes to demonstrate a “sense of place,” itself a
subjective and not legally-defined term.206 An additional problem is the use of precedent
for the LPC’s internal deliberations; a contact of mine who worked at the Commission as
a preservation researcher recounted that whenever the LPC received a nomination, they
first looked through their files to check if they have received the same property nomination
before. If they see that they have, and have denied the nomination, that is used as a
benchmark for future deliberations, to our detriment. By categorically ignoring new and
improved nominations, this LPC practice hurts communities that are trying to acquire
landmark protection. Despite these difficulties, the Historical Society remains everoptimistic that the LPC might someday accept the most recent nomination and grant the
community local historic district status. Meanwhile, some homeowners have become more
open to considering private preservation solutions such as the ones proposed in this thesis.
Among these homeowners are two of the staunchest supporters of local
preservation efforts, Joanne Tanzi and Helen Day, both members of the Historical Society.
In conversations and interviews with them, I have put forth my ideas of private preservation
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through deed restrictions and real covenants with likeminded neighbors, and they have
been very interested in these extra-governmental solutions. Tanzi believes that the idea of
a private, internal regulatory system among several neighbors is possible because of the
close ties through the local Catholic church and the block association. She is among the
most willing to personally restrict her property through a covenant or an easement because
of the personal trauma she felt when she saw Cataldi’s house altered beyond recognition
and stripped of its historic detailing. Tanzi has similarly conserved her Queen Anne home
and would hate to see it meet the same fate.207 On the other hand, Day has pointed out
several times that convincing people of willingly diminishing their property values in New
York City is a hard ask, and would only work if a large area of historic properties and their
owners mutually consented to internal self-regulation in the ways described in section 3.
Another homeowner, Diane Freel, owns a modest Dutch Colonial Revival house
where 1920s vaudeville star John Steel once lived. In board meetings, some members
discussed nominating individual houses piecemeal to the local register in an attempt at
somehow finding a loophole around the lack of success with citywide historic district
nominations. It was decided, with her consent, to nominate her house to the local register
because it was the residence of a minor celebrity and because she has preserved it through
the years. However, in a series of conversations with Freel during August of 2018, it
became clear to me that she did not fully understand the differences between local and
National Register designation; once she did, she did not support the local designation
process for her property as had been agreed upon at the board meeting because she felt it
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would encumber future owners, and remains undecided on the entire matter to this day.
This demonstrates the very high transaction costs when it comes to having individual
property owners overcome their fears of lost property values through either private or
public protections. They are a significant barrier in any community, but it is possible that
as time passes and a community unites more strongly, these costs could be overcome.

Kew Gardens – History
Kew Gardens was originally a hilly region just north of Richmond Hill, and was
used as a golf course for residents, with a clubhouse that became a private house, and a
lake hazard that was drained to make way for the new Long Island Railroad (LIRR) station
in 1910. Kew Gardens’ siting helped to protect it from the early years; it is bounded by
Forest Park and Forest Hills Gardens to the west, Flushing Meadows Corona Park to the
north, the Victorian and bucolic Maple Grove Cemetery to the northeast, and Richmond
Hill to the south. Similarly to Richmond Hill, the Man family imposed restrictive covenants
and regulated their application and enforcement through their development corporation,
the Kew Gardens Corporation [Image 8].208 The Mans donated some land and created
community institutions to serve as central gathering spaces to create community, such as
the neighborhood church, the Country Club, the elementary school, a hotel, and
commercial buildings running along the main thoroughfares of Lefferts and Metropolitan,
all of which are still standing (except the Clubhouse, demolished in the 1930s and now the
site of a historic Art Deco theater). Instead of imposing a regular grid of streets, they
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planned curving streets, a cul-de-sac, dead ends, and general variation in form to flow with
the hilly topography. The railroad line, running through the center of the town, which so
often divides communities, was instead overcome by a series of three bridges, the main
one being the Lefferts Avenue bridge, with shops on either side. This was called the ‘Ponte
Vecchio’ Bridge of Kew Gardens because the stores were hung from steel ceiling beams
and set over the passing trains; it is the center of the community to this day [Image 9].209
In terms of architectural design, most of the commercial buildings were either
Tudor Revival or Art Deco, and there was great variety of architectural styles for the houses
and the apartment buildings, from Tudor Revival, Dutch Colonial Revival, Georgian
Revival, Spanish or Italian Revival, and even Anglo-Japanese.210 The Mans decided to
generate variety in architectural styles with an Arts-and-Crafts sensibility and Beaux-Arts
language of craftsmanship to set it apart from the resolutely Victorian Richmond Hill and
the neo-Tudor Forest Hills Gardens next door, and to be more welcoming of people of
various tastes.211 Similarly, the Mans wanted to attract people of varying social classes and
wealth, which is still reflected in the varying sizes and types of properties, from the
grandest houses on very large lots to medium-sized homes on smaller lots, to rowhouses,
to apartment buildings for renters and condominiums.212 Throughout all areas, regardless
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of building type, the Mans were careful to make this a true garden suburb by planting
hundreds of trees and covenanting the same twenty-foot setbacks with verdant and united
lawns for visual and neighborly cohesion.213
Before the construction of the Interboro Parkway in 1935 that divided the two
neighborhoods, Kew Gardens and Forest Hills Gardens were much more united, sharing in
community as evinced through their social journal, The Kew-Forest Life. There exists
another remnant of this shared heritage, through the Kew-Forest School, a private school
on Union Turnpike where our nation’s current president studied. In the 1920s, Kew
Gardens became the choice of residence for dozens of writers, Broadway stars, movie
agents, because of its proximity to Manhattan and its village feel. It was home to celebrities
such as the celebrated pianists Josef and Rosina Lhevinne, Broadway actress Marjorie
Gateson, comedian and actor Will Rogers, Charlie Chaplin’s agent, at least one of the
Ziegfeld Follies, author Dorothy Parker, George Gershwin, and Nobel-laureate Ralph
Bunche, to name a few.214
After the 1930s, the neighborhood began to change as the Kew Gardens
Corporation, which enforced all the covenants, went bankrupt during the Great Depression,
as did the Country Club in 1933.215 The Kew Gardens Civic Association (KGCA), which
had been formed in 1914 to represent the interests of the homeowners, in particular against
the development of apartment houses in the 1920s, became the only community
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organization; however, it was unable to legally enforce any restrictions as there was only a
“gentleman’s agreement” regarding development.216 The 1930s also saw the arrival of
thousands of Jewish refugees who could not live in nearby Forest Hills Gardens because
of their racial deed restrictions. The community continued to thrive, and after the 1970s
and 1980s, saw the arrival of thousands of immigrants from Latin America, Asia, and
Eastern Europe, making the community incredibly diverse.217 This diversity again makes
it very difficult for there to be unity in community organization and goals. Furthermore,
many community organizations have sprouted up since the 1960s, beginning with the Kew
Gardens Improvement Association (KGIA), founded in 1970, which represents the
apartment dwellers and has done important work in protecting against overdevelopment
and lobbying for improvements.218
In addition to these two groups, there are a plethora of smaller community
associations, such as the Kew Gardens Council for Recreation and the Arts, Inc. (which
published Barry Lewis’ book), the Kew Gardens Youth Empowerment Program, the Forest
Park Barking Lot (which advocates for dog park improvements), my own Kew Gardens
Preservation Alliance (advocating for preservation efforts), the Save Kew Gardens
Coalition (specifically advocating for the saving of the Lefferts Boulevard Bridge), the
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Friends of Maple Grove (representing the historic Victorian cemetery in the
neighborhood), the Kew Gardens CSA (Community Supported Agriculture – advocating
for a food market), the No Kew Gardens Jail (fighting against a borough jail in the
community), among several others. Clearly there is a spirit for community organizing and
for being proactive about topics which residents are passionate about; the downside is that
there is factionalism and less cohesion than would be ideal.

Public Preservation Issues
For preservation purposes, there is no organization except the Preservation Alliance
currently advocating for historic preservation because of a complicated history of
preservation advocacy efforts in the community. According to art historian and community
resident Barry Lewis, in the 1980s he approached the KGCA suggesting that Kew Gardens
look into historic district protection to prevent non-contextual change. The then-president
disdainfully replied that “Kew Gardens [didn’t] need that,” presumably because of the
gentlemen’s agreements that had perhaps suggested that nothing might ever change.219
However, there was a push for raising awareness in the 1990s, culminating with the
publication of Lewis’ book Kew Gardens: Urban Village in the Big City (1999) and
followed up by a town hall meeting at the community center where the KGCA floated to
its members the idea of potentially beginning a nomination to the LPC for historic district
status. That meeting in early 2000 was allegedly heavily attended by Orthodox Jews from
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the neighborhood who adamantly opposed historic district designation. Apparently, that
was enough to shut down conversation about preservation, since the KGCA felt that it did
not have the support of the homeowners.220
An alternate version of the story, as told by several members of the KGCA and the
KGIA is that they invited Robert Tierney, then-Landmarks Commissioner, to Kew Gardens
to ask for his support in landmarking Kew Gardens. Nothing came of that, so several
residents place blame on the LPC for failing to take action in the early 2000s, when in fact
no consensus among Kew Gardens residents was ever reached, no research was conducted,
and no application was ever formally submitted.221 There seems to have been an erroneous
belief among too many homeowners and residents that the onus was on the LPC to
suddenly landmark Kew Gardens without any political effort from the community, which
is simply not how the system works. For instance, after a KGCA meeting in 2008, the
newsletter stated that “Efforts have been underway to preserve the Kew Gardens
neighborhood by having appropriate areas designated as a Historic District. In his
welcoming remarks, Dominick Pistone, President of the Kew Gardens Civic Association,
invited guests who support such efforts to write to the Chairman of the Landmarks
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Preservation Commission, urging him to consider the landmark designation that would
ensure that architecture would be preserved, and tear-downs curbed.”222 It is not clear what
such efforts were, besides writing and sending letters, because no actual historic district
nomination has ever been submitted for Kew Gardens. Queens preservation advocate
Jeffrey A. Kroessler has a similarly skewed understanding of how landmarking works; in
a defense of landmarking for communities such as Kew Gardens, he wrote that the
neighborhood never had a governing authority to oversee aesthetic regulations (which is
factually incorrect), and “For generations, the quality of the architecture, combined with a
common value system among the residents, seemed sufficient to maintain the character of
Kew Gardens,” a widely held and frankly ingenuous belief in the goodwill of people. He
goes on, writing that
According to association president Sylvia Hack, ‘For over eighty years, the
people of Kew Gardens have valued what they had and have. Now it is all
too apparent that unless we achieve historic designation and recognition, the
next generation may inherit only a shell of what exists.’ Unfortunately, their
campaign gained no traction at the Landmarks Preservation Commission
(LPC), and Kew Gardens remains vulnerable to market forces and the
vagaries of individual taste.223
Clearly, there is an erroneous and unfair belief that the traction had to be gained at the LPC,
when in fact the community itself had no preservation traction and no consensus.
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Rezoning
The KGCA and the KGIA did try to fight for the neighborhood in other ways,
mainly through zoning agreements. The city decided to rezone Kew Gardens in 2005, but
through the Community Board and the other organizations, an agreement was reached
whereby only a stretch of Queens Boulevard would be upzoned, as would 116th Street, a
low-density residential street that now has very large and uncontextual apartment buildings
after 14 years.224 In return, the residential areas were downzoned ostensibly to protect the
scale and character; however, that has not prevented new homeowners from tearing down
historic houses and building non-contextual “McMansions” in several parts of the
neighborhood that are allowed because they conform with zoning regulations.225 Another
effort in recent years was the push to have the city declare Kew Gardens a special zoning
district, but that recently failed as well. Indeed, Kew Gardens has lost significant amounts
of historic fabric already, so much that the Historic Districts Council has designated it a
neighborhood at risk.226

Lefferts Boulevard Bridge
The most recent community battle has been to save the historic Lefferts Boulevard
Bridge stores, which span the LIRR tracks on either side and as such are owned by the
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MTA and managed by a separate firm, currently Zee N Kay. By not renewing Zee N Kay’s
lease or introducing a new leaseholder, the MTA indicated that it could potentially declare
the bridges a safety hazard, tear them down, and build towers over the tracks, as Samuel
Lefrak did in the 1970s on the border between Kew Gardens and Forest Hills Gardens.227
The severely deteriorated and historic bridges had already been threatened in 1993, with
the MTA proposing the construction of 12-story condominiums on either side of the
Boulevard, but a large community-wide advocacy effort back then saved the bridges and
stores from demolition.228 In an almost identical scenario, in 2017 the MTA did not renew
the management company’s lease, and said that the bridges were beyond repair and could
be torn down, drawing the ire of many residents who criticized the MTA and the
management company’s decades-long dereliction. Ultimately, through an enormous
advocacy campaign wherein all major elected representatives were involved, the MTA
declared in 2018 that the bridges would be repaired with the councilperson’s $1 million
that had originally been slated for a feasibility study.229 The reason the historic bridge
inspires such outpouring of support is because the two store bridges stand at the very heart
of the community, being among the earliest structures built to accommodate the railway
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and give the community a commercial center that is still the center of community activity.
When iconic structures are threatened, communities like Kew Gardens place their internal
differences aside and move quickly to save them for posterity. These are valuable lessons
on the strength of advocacy work, although it is disconcerting that such outpouring of
support only really occurs when it is almost too late.

Kew Gardens Management Trust
As member of the Save Kew Gardens Coalition, I am helping draft a nomination
for these store bridges to add them to the National Register of Historic Places.230 The
Coalition board members were angered to discover in 2019 that the MTA was thinking of
renewing the Zee N Kay’s lease, which prompted calls for alternative solutions. I proposed
that the community itself manage the bridge and the leases, since we still cannot directly
own the bridge, as it spans over MTA property. This is where the applicability of communal
property ownership (or in this case management) and holding property in trust for
beneficiaries – the community itself – relates from the previous section. A few board
members picked up the idea and we have only recently founded the Kew Gardens
Management Trust (KGMT), an innovative public-private partnership approach to nonprofit property management. Lawyers who we consulted told us that they had never before
heard of a non-profit commercial property management organization, so in this case this
would be a significant first.231 As of today, the KGMT has only just been proposed to the
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MTA as a management firm alternative to Zee N Kay or any other master leaseholder that
might apply, and we are still waiting to hear back from the MTA. As a non-profit, the
KGMT would take all available rent monies (the MTA gets 30% of the shops’ rent) and
completely reinvest them into the bridge, making thorough repairs to the entire structures,
ensuring the stability of the stores and the storekeepers for decades to come. In contrast,
Zee N Kay conducted almost no repairs for years because of a great deal of conflict with
the MTA, and in addition simply pocketed the rent collected from the stores.232 Some
storekeepers support this proposal because it would mean the almost total reinvestment of
their rental payments to the properties’ improvement and perhaps the lowering of some of
their rents. Other storekeepers are skeptical of any new leaseholder, including a
community-led nonprofit – they would prefer to deal with the MTA directly and not
through a middle-man. These are some of the recent obstacles that the Coalition has found
in these attempts at saving the bridges.

Critiques of the LPC
Despite these realities for communities like Kew Gardens where residents have not
reached a consensus on preservation goals, there are still legitimate problems with the LPC
and the general pro-development culture in New York City. Dozens of articles reflect
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concerns and frustrations that preservationists have with the LPC. Since the Bloomberg
administration, preservationists have generally felt that the LPC has been derelict in its
duty to protect New York City’s built heritage by refusing to consider buildings or historic
districts (which have filed nomination applications), and by changing the rules of
landmarking and regulation. Simeon Bankoff, executive director of the Historic Districts
Council, a citywide advocacy group, believes that the “ ‘commission is laboring under
some fairly hostile environmental conditions and that doesn’t make it easy on them…
complicated by an active and rapacious real estate development market which reflexively
[bridles] at regulation.’”
Similarly, Andrew Berman, executive director of the Greenwich Village Society
for Historic Preservation stated that “ ‘the whole point of historic district/landmark
designations is to preserve and protect the special historic character of an area… when
large, out-of-context new buildings and additions are allowed in such areas, that special
character and those special qualities are diminished.”233 In recent years, the preservation
groups felt that the LPC was becoming too permissive in the allegedly non-contextual
alterations that it allowed on historic properties in terms of size, scale, and design.234
Preservationists believe that this pro-development attitude came from Mayor De Blasio
himself, who has received millions in campaign contributions from the Real Estate Board
of New York.235
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When an application for an alteration of a historic property comes to the LPC, if it
is small-scale, the staff will usually deal with it privately; for larger or more significant
alterations, it comes before the Commission and the public. In the past, if an alteration was
not approved by the Commission, the developer had to fix the plans and resubmit.
Nowadays, some developers will resubmit the same application with very few changes and
receive a notice of “no action” from the LPC, which would have not occurred before;
instead this term is now understood by the real estate industry that the plans have been
tacitly approved. The concern is that quiet approval of significant alterations will create a
precedent for developers to continue. As an anonymous preservationists reflected, “ ‘The
LPC won’t designate buildings because they are too altered, but will allow alterations to
buildings that are designated.’”236
In 2014, the LPC underwent a thorough internal review of their backlog of
properties that had been waiting for years to receive a hearing. While preservation
advocates praised this because it meant that properties were finally getting a hearing (some
after 40 years of being ‘calendared’), there was also intense criticism from the preservation
community for the way that the LPC handled the situation. The Commission wanted to
quietly remove two historic districts and 95 properties from consideration for nomination
without any public input whatsoever, which greatly alarmed preservationists. Although
they argued that by removing the sites from the backlog, they allowed communities to renominate them, the lack of transparency did not help the LPC’s public relations, and the
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move was criticized as bad public policy.237 Ultimately, after backlash from the
preservation community, the LPC looked through all the properties and narrowed down the
priorities, and only 26 of the sites were landmarked.238 During this process, the mayor
signed a new law which allows the LPC only one year to landmark or pass up calendared
sites, and two years to decide on historic districts. If those limits ran out, the site must be
de-calendared or removed from consideration, and the nomination process restarted by the
nominator. The LPC supported this measure because it would streamline the process, while
preservationists claimed it would adversely hurt advocacy groups by pressuring their
research and hurt the LPC staff as well.239
Furthermore, in 2018, the LPC overhauled its internal rules relating to the
nomination process and applications for alterations of historic properties, alleging that it
would streamline the process and make it more transparent by letting staff handle most
applications for alterations. Preservationists were again up in arms because one of the most
significant rule changes called for less public oversight, thereby limiting the opportunity
for providing testimony.240 After the backlash, the LPC amended its rule changes to focus
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on rules regarding materiality and lesser alterations, and this iteration passed unanimously
last year.241
Among the most thorough critiques of the LPC’s current work has been from the
preservation advocacy group The Society for the Architecture of the City, which in 2017
privately published a book, Undoing Historic Districts, outlining the many ways the LPC
has forgotten its mission. For instance, in recent years the LPC has begun listing more and
more properties in new historic districts as ‘non-contributing’ structures that have ‘no
style,’ which essentially makes it easier to make a case later on for their alteration or even
demolition.242 The Society takes umbrage and sees a serious problem with how the LPC
has begun relying on new, subjective yet legally-binding terms and applying them in
limiting ways that bode well for developers and badly for preservationists. Such terms
include ‘non-contributing,’ ‘style: none,’ ‘period of significance,’ and, as we saw in
Richmond Hill, the subjective ‘sense of place.’243 In a broad sense, critics believe that the
LPC has put aside its mission to protect the built heritage of New York City in favor of
aiding development and of streamlining internal administrative and managerial systems.244
Although Kew Gardens has never formally applied for historic district status, and
the LPC is not to blame for that situation, there have been many communities and buildings
that have been nominated and have either sat in a backlog for years and even decades or
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have been repeatedly denied, as in the case of Richmond Hill.245 The neighborhood of
Sunset Park in Brooklyn has been a National Register Historic District for 30 years and
submitted a local historic district nomination in 2013 with intense community support for
preservation; they only recently heard back from the LPC that four smaller districts are
being calendared, after six years of silence and loss of historic fabric.246 Therefore, while
the job that the LPC does is truly commendable, and does protect thousands of historic
properties throughout New York City, in many instances preservation advocates and
communities feel frustrated at the slow bureaucratic and political situation that does not
allow them to save historic structures in time. Preservationists throughout New York City
would like the city to better fund the LPC so that staff members could more adequately
research and process nominations and applications for alterations. This would go a long
way to supporting a municipal preservation agenda and convincing New Yorkers that the
LPC is fighting for their heritage, which perhaps it cannot adequately do in its underfunded
state that results in slow results. Until these improvements in the public arena come to
fruition, it is important to explore private preservation tools that are available to property
owners and communities.

Feasibility of Proposals and Conclusion
As we have explored in this thesis, alternatives to public preservation solutions do
exist and can expanded upon through private legal methods and common land ownership.
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Inspired by Howard and George’s visions and by the real-life example of Forest Hills
Gardens, residents and communities can use private preservation tools to protect their
heritage and their communities. While it is indeed difficult because of the high transaction
costs, namely the political, social, and economic tasks of convincing people of these radical
proposals, I have seen several steps in favor of private preservation in these two case studies
back home.247
Faced with the reality of preservation in New York City, we can address the
feasibility of proposing private preservation solutions, namely in these two case studies in
Queens. In Richmond Hill, we have the case of homeowners who have actively appealed
to the LPC for decades to protect their Victorian community to no avail. It was not until a
powerful ally in the form of the new councilman funded a very thorough study that
Richmond Hill received noteworthy recognition as a National Register Historic District.
However, the community is still seeking local designation to legally protect the properties.
In speaking to some of the homeowners there over the years, I have proposed the idea of
self-regulation through deed restrictions, real covenants, or easements. Some homeowners
have been willing to consider these solutions, as development continues threatening the
built heritage, but others are more uneasy and are understandably concerned with losing
their property values. It is easier to garner support in Richmond Hill because the Victorian
section represents a tight-knit community of like-minded preservation advocates, but true
private preservation could only come through widespread and united homeowner support
for private self-regulation through covenants and easements.
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In Kew Gardens, homeowners are less open to landmarking their properties because
of their higher return values, and because of cultural biases toward governmental
regulation. The community has historically remained divided on the issue of historic
district status, as I have learned through my own advocacy work. The task of educating
people about the merits of preservation and the value of saving our built heritage is a long
and difficult one, and one which I am working on through my own Alliance. However,
because of the Lefferts Bridge situation, some community activists have grown tired of
fearing the loss of irreplaceable heritage that sits at the core of the community, and are very
open to establishing the nonprofit management trust that can hopefully take charge of the
bridge stores and commit to their substantial repair. In this way, this represents one step
forward towards the vision of community ownership of heritage assets; perhaps one day
residents will be able to pool their resources together to collectively buy shares and
properties in the community and make a small profit from it.
Together, Richmond Hill and Kew Gardens tell a narrative of public preservation
advocacy efforts to protect property that have not worked out. These two historic, garden
suburb communities sit in close proximity to Forest Hills Gardens, the perfectly preserved,
garden city-inspired, privately regulated garden suburb. Because of Richmond Hill’s more
tight-knit and pro-preservation community of homeowners, there is greater potential for
the feasibility of preservation through covenants regulated among homeowners. In Kew
Gardens, there is more potential for communal land management with the Lefferts
Boulevard Bridge, using the legacy of communal stake in land that Howard and George
proposed. Despite any hope for private preservation, there are significant social, political,
economic, and cultural transaction costs to overcome, including the systemic preference
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for private land ownership and the desire to protect high property values. Community unity
is of the utmost importance, as are continued education and advocacy efforts to teach
residents of their shared heritage and raise awareness of the importance of preservation,
and of the preservation solutions that exist, both public and private.
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Section 6 – Conclusion
When Ebenezer Howard published his Garden Cities of To-Morrow, audiences at first
were skeptical of the work, but it was soon widely read and enthusiastically received,
allowing him to go through with the creation of the first garden city at Letchworth within
the decade. His vision of radical social transformation through a new system of land tenure,
however, proved too revolutionary for most garden city-inspired communities, and
throughout the world only the shell and not the substance of his vision remains.248 Despite
this, elements of his ideas for this private socialism through entrepreneurial cooperation
continued to live on and multiply in the form of private communities and land trusts.249
Although private legal land ownership tools and ideas of communal ownership and
management of land have existed before and apart from Howard’s vision, the heritage of
planned garden communities such as Richmond Hill and Kew Gardens makes his legacy
all the more relevant. As communities struggle to adapt to the realities of development,
displacement, and lost heritage and community, we can look at Howard’s vision for a
radical approach to land tenure and management that helps us envision novel ways of
preserving heritage and community through the private realms.
This thesis aims to join the growing conversation around the search for new ways
of thinking about the ownership and management of property, not only for the benefit of
people in their fight against income inequality and displacement but also through the
narrower lens of the preservation of built and intangible heritage.250 There is already a
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growing trend toward the privatization of municipal services throughout the nation, most
salient in the proliferation of private governments for residential development and
corporations for commercial growth.251 Several real or perceived failures on the part of
municipalities and their agencies to deliver results to communities are a source of
inspiration for residents to look at private, extra-governmental cooperative solutions. This
was evident in both Richmond Hill and Kew Gardens, where frustrations with the LPC and
the MTA through the decades have led residents to look at new ways of thinking about
property restrictions and management tools outside the government.
The field of historic preservation has since its beginnings been very reactionary to
the loss of heritage. Part of the benefit with using private legal tools and new forms of land
ownership and management is that it gives preservationists the power to be proactive and
to take control of the situations that threaten communities’ fabric and heritage. The
movement toward privatization in the United States is a controversial one because it is part
of a larger conversation about the appropriate size, role, and interventions of government;
for the use of private governments and new forms of land tenure as proposed here, support
can come from both sides of the political spectrum. From a conservative or libertarian
perspective, a call to privatization is encouraged because it limits the role of government
and encourages private associations; from a liberal or progressive perspective, the radical
idea of communal property ownership is championed as a private socialist endeavor that
serves the people’s common interests.
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In such a way, this was the genius of Howard’s radical proposal – it sought to
balance different interests from the social, economic, and political spectrums. In the same
way, by reappropriating his ideas to modern-day uses, we can try to mitigate the harm being
inflicted upon people and communities by income inequality, displacement, and heritage
loss. Scholars throughout the political spectrum agree that something must be done to fix
crises such as the affordable housing crisis, which is also tied to income inequality and lack
of agency. As social justice advocate Chuck Matthei wrote, now is the time “to move from
a policy of subsidy to one of equity,” by helping individuals and communities rise up
through direct ownership and acquire direct profits from the ownership and management
of property and land.252
By looking at how private contractual agreements can be used in existing
communities that desire internal regulatory protections, this thesis proposed that likeminded neighbors join forces to self-regulate through the law of real covenants and/or
easements. Public regulation may simply not be the solution for all neighborhoods that
want to stop or control change, and internal private management of heritage resources may
be the best solution.253 Inspired by Howard’s vision of communal land ownership, we
explored a host of tools available to communities under the umbrella land trust system that
use single-ownership, land-lease and limited equity cooperatives structures to remove
speculation and preserve communities. The use of REITs in a preservation, social-impact
framework has potential as well, as it gives shareholders a reason to invest in heritage and
a desire to maintain it.
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These proposals are not without significant drawbacks, and I acknowledge that high
transaction costs are notable obstacles to real reform. These costs come in the form of
social, economic, and political hurdles, on both a personal or local and broader or societal
level. Convincing property owners to forget their property values for the greater communal
good is a difficult task, although as shown, there have been some examples of residents
and communities that donate easements for the conservation of heritage and land. In
addition, there are educational and advocacy efforts that we as preservation advocates must
engage in to inform residents of how preservation in the public and private realms
functions. Educating potential stakeholders on the value of buying shares in heritage or
non-heritage properties is another notable obstacle, but crowdfunding precedents have
shown promise for local investment alternatives.
There are valid arguments to be made in favor of fixing the areas of government
that we are unsatisfied with, and of investing in the public realm through increased funding
in people and resources. However, the proposal for private preservation solutions is not a
call for substituting the public realm’s important and historic job, but for serving as an
additional tool that preservation and communities can use. The field of preservation stands
at an important point in time, with calls to be more inclusive of more people, stories, and
ideas. By learning from the past and incorporating new private solutions for the future, we
can ensure that preservation helps communities manage change through time for the greater
good.
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Appendix of Images

Image 1 Howard's Garden City vision as a diagram, 1902. Source: Research Gate.
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Image 2 The three communities in Queens, with Kew Gardens highlighted at center, from Google Maps.
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Image 3 View of a house in Forest Hills Gardens, via Creative Commons.

Image 4 Gramercy Square in New York, via Creative Commons.
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Image 5 Louisburg Square in Boston, circa 1920s, via Creative Commons.

Image 6 Bacatá Tower in 2015. Bogotá, Colombia, via Creative Commons.
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Image 7 1873 Beers Map of Richmond Hill and golf course, courtesy of Richmond Hill Historical Society.
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Image 8 Map of Kew Gardens circa 1920 showing where development was prohibited, courtesy of the
KGCA.
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Image 9 "Ponte Vecchio" bridges and stores, circa 1940, courtesy of KGCA.
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